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INTRODUCTION
One of the keys to the promotion of economic growth that
enables countries to progress from recession to recovery is
increasing the quantity and quality of technological inventions
developed. 1 Concerns about the steady erosion of the United
States’ (U.S.) position as the world leader in science and
technology—areas which are considered to be the critical building
blocks to the U.S. economy—led President Barack Obama to make
improving innovation a top priority during his presidency, which
included initiating a study on ways to improve innovation. 2 This
move by the U.S. President came at a time when many other
nations had started to lay strong foundations in these same areas. 3
The study was based on the idea that, in order to succeed in
maintaining U.S. strength, we must have the will to implement and
sustain the policies that will prepare the U.S. to continue being an
economic leader moving forward. 4 The main conclusions of the
1

See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE COMPETITIVENESS AND INNOVATIVE CAPACITY OF
U.S. 2–1 (2012), available at http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/2012/january/competes_010511_0.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) [hereinafter
WHITE HOUSE STUDY].
2
WHITE HOUSE STUDY, supra note 1. On January 4, 2011, President Barack Obama
signed the America Competes Reauthorization Act of 2010. Pub. L. No. 111–385, 124
Stat. 3982 (2011) (hereinafter “Competes Act”). Section 604 of the Competes Act
instructs the Secretary of Commerce to complete a study that addresses the economic
competitiveness and innovative capacity of the United States. The study was carried out
by the U.S. Department of Commerce, signed by the Secretary of Commerce, John E.
Brtyson, and completed in January 2012. See also WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.
(WIPO), WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDICATORS, WIPO ECONOMICS AND
STATISTICS SERIES 3, 21 fig.3 (2011) [hereinafter WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INDICATORS] (illustrating that the US contribution to the global change in total volume of
filings narrowed from 23.9% in 1983-1980 to 19.4% in 1995-2008).
3
Soumitra Dutta and Bruno Lanvin, Eds., THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2013 –
THE LOCAL DYNAMICS OF INNOVATION, at v (Cornell, INSEAD and WIPO, 2013)
available at: http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/economics/gii/
gii_2013.pdf.
4
Id. (“Innovation is the key driver of competitiveness, wage and job growth, and long
term economic growth.”).
THE
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White House Study on fostering innovation were based on three
pillars: (a) enlarging federal support of research in innovative
fields; (b) improving the education system by improving
preparatory programs in science and technology related fields; and
(c) improving infrastructure, such as broadband internet access. 5
This Article suggests a completely different path towards
achieving the same final goal, a path that was entirely neglected in
the White House study—that is, the significant and substantial role
of employee-inventors in elevating the level of U.S. innovation
within the workplace. 6 Considering the fact that around eighty to
ninety percent of all inventions in the U.S. are the work of
employed inventors, 7 one might be surprised that the employeeinventors were not part of the discussions and, indeed, were not
mentioned at all. Improving the productivity of these employed
inventors, in order to generate more innovative ideas and pursue
worthy ones to the point of economic viability, has to become a
critical factor in the modern commercial era, and even more so
now in a time of recession.
The intersection between the roles and rights of employers and
those of employee-inventors is the focus of this Article, since they
are relevant to the achievement of growth and development.
Employed inventors play a major role in the promotion and
advancement of technological innovation, and therefore,
policymakers should give ample weight to their role. The research
embodied in this Article suggests a desirable new policy for the
allocation of rights in and benefits from inventions developed by
employees. 8
I further suggest that the recent modifications of Patent laws in
the U.S. and abroad, instead of considering the integral role of
5

WHITE HOUSE STUDY, supra note 1, at v–viii.
See discussion infra Parts IV, V.
7
See Henrik D. Parker, Reform for Rights of Employed Inventors, 57 S. CAL. L. REV.
603, 603 (1984) (stating that “[b]ecause technological innovation is one of the United
States’ most important economic resources, this country cannot afford to allow other
countries to continue carving out increasingly larger shares of the market for
technology”); William P. Hovell, Patent Ownership: An Employer’s Rights to His
Employee’s Invention, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863, 863 (1983) (“Eighty-four percent of
American patents are awarded to employed inventors . . . .”).
8
See discussion infra Part VI.
6
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employed inventors, evidence continued strengthening of the procorporate approach. 9 For example, in the U.S., the America
Invents Act amended U.S. Patent law to facilitate employer
organizations to submit patent applications without an oath or
declaration from the employee-inventor. 10 If the employer entity
has a financial interest in the invention, it can proceed without
seeking the inventor’s approval. 11 Before this amendment, patent
applications included the employee-inventor’s oath or declaration,
and the patent was filed under the employee-inventor’s name even
when the employer had an economic interest in the invention. 12
In Germany, the German Service Invention Act was modified
to now state that if the employer does not explicitly waive his or
her claim regarding the service invention within four months of
receiving an employee’s report, the invention and all the rights
associated with it belong to the employer. 13 Previously, German
Patent law was based on the principle that the employee was the
owner of the invention and an employer was required to explicitly
claim the rights in the invention, in compliance with strict rules
that included compensation for the employee-inventor. 14 Similar
changes have also been suggested in Israeli Patent law. 15
9

See also Patents Law, 5727-1967, IL001 (1967) (Isr.), Draft Amendment (number
10), 2010, §§ 18–19. The Act amends Sections 132-134 of the Patent Act, and suggests a
new scheme for allocating to the employer the rights in the employees’ inventions in
cases in which the employee-inventor did not report the existence of any invention (not
limited to service inventions) and also imposes restrictions on employee-inventor
entitlement to consideration for service inventions when the employer has any other
contractual arrangement with the employee. These amendments also favor the
employer’s rights over the ones of the employee.
10
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4, 125 Stat. 284, 293–97
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
11
Id.
12
See Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and its
Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 95 (2012).
13
Gesetz uber Arbeitnehmererfindungen [The German Service Invention Act], 1957
(modified in 2009), BGBI. I S. at 2521 (Ger.)
14
See Morag Peberdy & Alain Strowel, Employee’s Right to Compensation for
Inventions – A European Perspective, PLC CROSS-BORDER LIFE SCIENCES HANDBOOK, 67
(2009).
15
Patents Law, 5727-1967, IL001 (1967) (Isr.), Draft Amendment (number 10), 2010,
§§ 18–19 (amending §§ 132-134 of the Patent Act, and suggesting a new scheme for
allocating to the employer the rights in the employees’ inventions in cases in which the
employee-inventor did not report the existence of any invention and also imposing

144

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:140

These recent policy choices are part of a phenomenon that has
been on the rise and already noted by scholars towards the end of
the last century. 16 This Article argues against both the growing
general popularity of the pro-corporate approach, as well as its
underlying goals and justifications. 17 The Article claims that these
goals and justifications are neither constitutionally nor
theoretically sound. 18
The majority of scholars who justify increasing corporate
power and broadening protection to employers in the allocation of
intellectual property (IP) rights within the workplace anchor their
conclusions in law and economics. 19
These utilitarian
justifications were preferred over others and have now become the
restrictions on employee-inventor entitlement to consideration for service inventions
when the employer has any other contractual arrangement with the employee).
16
See Robert Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law,
1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2215–33 (2000) (describing the “corporatization” of
patent law; whereas in 1885, only 12% of patents were issued to corporations, and by
1998, only 12.5% of patents were issued to independent inventors. The rules governing
ownership of employee inventions changed in ways that favored corporations and courts
demonstrated an eagerness to enforce employment contracts signing ownership over to
the corporation. The shift toward preference of corporations can be seen in emergence of
a default rule in favor of employer and in criticism of the tendency to favor the employed
inventors).
17
See discussion infra Parts I, II.
18
See discussion infra Parts IV, V.
19
See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 1–5
(Harvard Coll. Press 2004) (asserting that the measure of social welfare as well as
morality and fairness will usually not accord importance to the economic analysis of
intellectual property and to the distribution of utilities); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 37–45, 44 (6th ed., 2003) (“[T]he economic benefits of investing in
intellectual property are not exhausted in the initial creation . . . .”); Dan L. Burk,
Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 4, 8 (2004) (conceiving of
intellectual property rights as mechanisms for coordinating activities between firms as
well as for coordinating ordinate re-resource allocation within a firm); Robert P. Merges,
The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (1999)
(defending prevailing default rules, as well as the strong presumption that employee
invention contracts should be enforced); see also Barak Y. Orbach, The Law and
Economics of Creativity at the Workplace, in THE HARVARD JOHN M. OLIN DISCUSSION
PAPER SERIES 1, 118 (Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 356, 2002), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/356.pdf;
Michael
D.
Birnhack, Who Owns Bratz? The Integration of Copyright and Employment Law, 20
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 95, 125, 140, 154–57 (2009) (criticizing the
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court in the Bratz v. Barbie case by raising claims based on
a law and economics perspective).
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dominant school of thought in contemporary intellectual property
theory. 20 The predominance of the utilitarian calculus likewise
influences the scope and content of today’s intellectual property
laws. In reexamining the subject, I argue that these justifications
may in fact lead to a different conclusion. 21 The allocation of
rights in inventions and works developed by employees may
actually give the employer a windfall when weighed against what
is necessary to achieve optimal production.
Economic/utilitarian theories of IP law are widely enlisted as
the justification for the exclusive allocation of property rights in
employee IP production to employers, either by courts or by
employee contracts transferring all intellectual property rights to
the employer. 22 Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether the economic
approach necessarily leads to desirable results. It may indeed be
that the economic approach actually compels a less than total
transfer of rights to the employer. A deeper examination of the
economic analysis discloses the tension between arguments
favoring a categorical preference for the employer as the exclusive
recipient of rights in intellectual property products and arguments
that favor the buttressing of employees’ rights. 23 This Article
20

See Peter Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 129, 129–30 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
21
See discussion infra Part I.
22
See Merges, supra note 19, at 2–3.
23
See, e.g., Parker, supra note 7, at 603–04 (explaining that the United States is in
danger of losing its position as the technological leader of the world as American
innovation has decreased resulting in less patent productivity per dollar of investment
than in many foreign countries and arguing that the current law does not incentivize
employed inventors and this poses a threat to one of the United States’ most important
economic resources); Jay Dratler, Jr., Incentives for People: The Forgotten Purpose of
the Patent System, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 129, 130–34 (1979) (arguing that the current
patent laws fail to provide effective incentives to inventors, most of whom work for large
corporate or government employers, because the laws allow employers to require
employee-inventors to assign all potential inventions to their employers); Hovell, supra
note 7, at 863 (“The law must find a realistic but fair method of dividing an invention’s
value between the inventor and the developer. The patent law, therefore, needs a broad,
clear rule which will allow a fair division in most circumstances.”); Pat K. Chew, Faculty
Generated Inventions: Who Owns the Golden Egg?, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 259 (1992)
(considering policy arguments against university ownership of faculty-generated
inventions); Ann Bartow, Inventors of the World Unite! A Call for Collective Action by
Employee-Inventors, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 673, 684 (1997) (asserting that even
brilliant and diligent labor by a properly-equipped and well supported inventor offers no
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surveys both sets of claims, focusing on the question of whether
the complete allocation of rights to employers ignores factors that
favor a different mode of allocation and, as a result, causes
efficiency failures in the specific areas that it purports to serve.
This Article not only argues the case for a more balanced
approach to the employer/employee-inventor within the workplace,
but it also suggests a new model of rights allocation, one which
would arguably enlarge the “whole pie” in a manner that would
benefit employers, employees, and the public at large. 24 Moreover,
this subject, unlike many others concerning intellectual property, is
not regulated by international protocol. I point out that the
inefficiency deriving from the absence of international regulation
of employee-inventor rights stresses the need to establish an
international tool, under the auspices of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), to address and regulate allocation
of rights within the workplace. 25
In introducing the subject and laying the groundwork for its
discussion, I will briefly review the economic/utilitarian
justifications for intellectual property law. Subsequently, I will
then primarily focus on the example of patents in developing an
enhanced model for the allocation of employee-developed IP
rights. Whereas most of the literature justifies the existing system,
or else objects to it by presenting alternative theories, the principal
innovation of this Article lies in its justification—stemming from a
new law and economics perspective—of a more balanced model of
allocating rights, which attaches significantly greater importance to
employees’ rights.
Part I of this Article provides a brief description of the current
dominant U.S. legal approach regarding the rights and benefits of
inventions developed by employees, mainly supporting
transferring all IP rights in IP products from employed inventors to
the employer/corporation. This Article argues that it is apparent
from recent court decisions that courts have played a major role in
the validation of this pro-corporate policy through enforcement of
assurance of a profitable or even useful outcome, regardless of the amount of money or
time invested).
24
See infra Part VI.
25
Id.
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pre-invention assignments of all intellectual property rights from
employees to employers by contract. Part I further describes the
drawbacks of the current IP “pro-corporate” regime, such as the
insufficient level of innovation when compared to IP regimes in
other countries, as well as the problem of employers who adopt
patent troll patterns by submerging inventions developed by
employees without developing them for the benefit of the whole
society. Part II discusses, from innovative perspectives, the
ramifications of the uncertainty surrounding transactions when
transferring IP rights to inventions from the employed inventor to
his or her employer. This section describes the problem of “preinvention” transfer of rights, when the employees, usually
unknowingly, waive the rights in products (or ideas) they have not
yet developed (or thought about) at an early stage before they even
commence work. This Article criticizes the traditional explanation
of risk allocation in the workplace, considering the employees as
risk averse and the employer as risk neutral, because it ignores the
specific features of the modern employed inventor. Inter alia, the
traditional analysis considers neither the risks of employed
inventors nor the current era of “start-ups,” where employees
become risk-seeking and eager to develop their own ideas while
investors are willing to invest in the early “seed” phase inventions
that employers might ignore. This Article also analyzes a new
study about the implications of risks under uncertainty on
allocation of rights and describes the problematic outcomes to
employed inventors and, as a result, on the innovation level. Part
III introduces the implications of the Principal-Agent theory on the
allocation of IP rights between employer and employed inventor.
The conclusion is that, in order to avoid the representative
problem, employed inventors should benefit from the outcome of
their works. Part IV discusses the importance of incentives for
employed inventors during the many stages of the development
process of IP products within the workplace. This discussion
strongly supports providing greater incentive for employed
inventors in order to elevate the level of innovation. Having
described the proposed solution to give employees a better share in
order to enlarge the “whole pie,” one might reasonably expect the
“free” market to reach this optimum result by adopting the most
efficient strategy of allocation of rights and benefits between
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employer and employed inventors. This Article argues in Part V
that the market fails to reach efficiency on this point. Furthermore,
this Article explains why the “free” market did not adopt efficient
rules to promote and improve innovation level in the U.S.
Cognitive biases, differences in bargaining power and the
ineffectiveness of labor unions in the IP regime, have led to a nonoptimal level of output of innovative products in the workplace.
Finally, Part VI suggests a new alternative model, based on the
theoretical discussion, which is oriented to promote innovation in
the U.S.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHIN THE WORKPLACE:
EXISTING JUSTIFICATIONS
A. The Current Intellectual Property Regime
Over the years, American law has adopted a policy of giving
the employers (almost) all of the intellectual property rights in
products developed by employees in the work place. 26 This policy
has developed rapidly over the past few decades when, despite
having roots favoring inventors, we have now moved toward
designing new legal policies that have recently reached its most
fevered pitch. 27 Under this new “ultra” pro-corporate regime,
almost all rights in employees’ inventions are assigned to
employers via either express or implied contracts, hence
transferring IP rights from the employee-inventors to the
employers. 28 Courts have routinely upheld such contracts. My
examination of the most recent court decisions on this topic
indicates that almost all of the decisions favor the employer
“receiving” rights from the employees’ patent assignment
agreement, either expressed in the view of at least one of the
judges, or decided at some point in the case’s history. 29 Almost
26

See Parker, supra note 7, at 606–08 (explaining the common law of patents and how
“[i]n response to ambiguities involved in applying common law doctrines, employers
began using written contracts to allocate invention rights”).
27
See Merges, supra note 16.
28
Id.
29
See, e.g., Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 684 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (asserting
that employee assignment agreement was valid and enforceable with only continued
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universally, assignment agreements in which employees
transferred rights to their inventions to the employer are
recognized as valid, including in cases where the employees were
not “Employed-To-Invent” (“ETI”) and even when the assignment
of rights from employees to the employer was implicit. 30 This
tendency has been justified within a contractual framework. 31
This Article argues for a rethinking of the current policy
toward a more balanced approach that instead considers the
important role of employed inventors, but from a new perspective
of uncertainty, which will be explained infra in Part II, that has not
yet been deeply discussed in the literature. This perspective may
shed new light upon existing policy and illuminate possible
alternatives to achieve more robust results.
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution endows
“inventors” with rights to their “discoveries” (Patent Clause). 32 It
is of note that the clause does not mention employer rights to an
inventor’s work product. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
specifically ruled in United States v. Dubilier that this default rule

employment as consideration); DDB Tech., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517
F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that the employment agreement contained express
assignment of rights in future inventions, and therefore an assignment of patent under the
agreement would have been automatic); Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321
F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (ruling that inventors were contractually obligated to assign
patents and applications to university and that university was entitled to ownership of
patents); SIRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(holding that the language of the employee assignment of rights to the employer
provided for automatic assignment—no need for further steps); Harsco Corp. v.
Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906 (3d Cir.1985) (affirming that the assignment agreement included
inventions conceived by employee prior to his or her signing of agreement; employer’s
agreement to continue to employ employee for a reasonable period of time provided
sufficient consideration for patent assignment); Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp.,
83 F.3d 403 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that even an implied-in-fact contract to assign
patent rights to employer existed within employer-employee relationship, in the absence
of explicit agreement); Hedvat, supra note 4, at 823 (“[D]ecisions today focus more on
the collective nature of research and development.”).
30
See, e.g., Preston, 584 F.3d 1276 (holding that employee, a relief pumper in a
resource extraction operation, who was not employed to invent must transfer rights to
employer); Teets, 83 F.3d 403 (ruling that there was an implied-in-fact contract to assign
inventive rights to employer).
31
See Teets, 83 F.3d at 408.
32
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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can be contracted around. 33 The Court stated that in the event of a
contractual transfer of rights, the contract is enforceable and the
rights will be transferred to the employer even if the contract was
drawn up before the employee began work. 34 Furthermore, in the
event that there was no explicit contractual transfer of rights, if the
worker falls under the ETI category, the rights will pass
automatically from the employee to the employer. 35 Other courts
have held that, in cases where the employee made use of the
employer’s resources, the employer will receive a non-exclusive
right of use for no consideration, also known as a “shop right.” 36
Thus, the courts have played a major role in the validation and
enforcement of assignments of intellectual property rights from
employees to employers. This allocation of rights ostensibly stems
from the attempted “balancing” of rights between the employer
and the employee that would, presumably, spur the most invention
(so as to comply with the dictates of the Patent Clause). 37
However, the actual result of the despotic nature of this proemployer approach is that a significant number of employment
contracts transfer all intellectual property rights to employers and
thereby divest the employees of any rights to inventions usually in
the very early stages of their employment. This minimizing of
employee’s rights and consequently, their motivation level,
obviously cannot maximize economic growth.
This policy of favoring employers has developed so widely that
employers now can almost assume ownership of the very thoughts
of employees. An example of this is an arrangement for
encouraging workers’ proposals, known as an “employee

33

United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933).
See id.
35
See id.
36
See, e.g., Kaplan v. Johnson, 409 F.Supp. 190, 199 (N.D. III. 1976) (“Shop rights
can be best described as an irrevocable, free, and nonexclusive license to the employer to
use the employee’s invention.”); see also Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488 (5th Cir.
1976); Pursche v. Atlas Scraper & Eng’g, Co., 300 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1961).
37
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (holding “[i]nnovation,
advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent
requisites in a patent system” governed by a command such as the one found in the
Constitution of the United States).
34
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suggestion plan.” 38 These arrangements govern situations in
which employees raise ideas on a voluntary basis and, in the event
that the idea is approved, such a plan dictates that it becomes the
exclusive property of the employer. 39 In exchange, the employee
can then be entitled to future consideration in the form of payment,
but such payment is sometimes discretionary. 40 Further, employee
suggestion plans are, on occasion, found to be mere gratuities that
do not give rise to a binding obligation on the employer to even
award the employee for his/her idea. 41
37F

38F

39F

40F

A further example of employee ideas vesting in the employer is
found in the Brown v. Alcatel case. 42 In Brown, the court ruled
that a company owned the rights to an idea that existed entirely in
the thoughts of a former employee. 43 The court’s ruling takes the
idea of an employer’s ownership of employee inventions to its
most absurd conclusion.
However, the U.S. regime is certainly not the only alternative.
Other leading industrialized countries have adopted vastly different
41F

42F

38

See Fish v. Ford Motor Co., 41 Ohio App. 3d 113, 115 (1987) (“The purpose of
having an employee suggestion plan is to reward ideas and promote employee
participation in the manufacturing process. These programs are to give the employees
incentives to work harder and generate possible improvements. The rewards given may
be minimal compared to the benefits to the company, but an employee that is rewarded
may work more eagerly knowing quality work will be appreciated.”); see also Donna
Domagala, Employee Suggestion Plans: Building a Better Mousetrap or the
Misappropriation of Ideas?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 39l, 392–93 (1997) (“Despite the
notion that no one ‘owns’ ideas, courts have recognized that people often expend
considerable resources in creating ideas with an expectation to recover value from their
use.”).
39
See Domagala, supra note 38, at 419–20.
40
See Hodgkins v. New England Tel. Co., 82 F.3d 1226, 1228 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding
that a clause in an employee suggestion plan which reserved full discretion to the
employer when awarding employees was not an illusory promise but that the employer
could not refuse to award an employee arbitrarily).
41
See Domagala, supra note 38, at 396–97 (noting that suggestion box systems do
elicit extra ideas from employees, but that compensation for ideas falls below the level
that might be expected.). But see Grepke v. Gen. Elec. Co., 280 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1960)
(holding employee was damaged by employer’s appropriation of his idea, where
employee suggested a novel method for inserting balancing weights in armatures of
electric motors, which the employer rejected and later used).
42
Brown v. Alcatel USA, Inc., No. 05-02-01678-CV, 2004 WL 1434521 (Tex. App.,
5th Dist. June 28, 2004).
43
Id. at *3.
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policies and as we have recently seen, are thriving economically.
In Japan, for example, an amendment to their patent laws provides
that the employee-inventor is entitled to reasonable compensation
for his or her invention. 44 In the Scandinavian states, Germany,
and France, the statutory regime regulating employees’ rights over
their inventions also grants rights of compensation to the
45
employee-inventor.
Furthermore, in some cases such
compensation is subject to employee mandatory entitlement to
reasonable consideration above and beyond his or her salary. 46
43F

4F

45F

B. Drawbacks of the Current Intellectual Property Regime
1. The Level of Innovation
One of the principal downsides of the current U.S. regime is
that such a policy fails to capitalize on an employee’s potential
productivity. The level of potential innovation can be examined by
exploring the number of patent applications from a particular
country at any given year. 47 It is well known that in the United
States, the total number of patent applications per year is
significantly high. 48 However, these figures might be misleading.
46F

47F

44

Patent Act, Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 35; see also JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, THE CASE
STUDIES OF THE PROCEDURES UNDER THE NEW EMPLOYEE INVENTION SYSTEM, 9–11
(2004), available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/iken_e/pdf/200408_newep/001.pdf.
45
See Sanna Wolk, Remuneration of Employee Inventors – Is There a Common
European Ground?, 42 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. AND COMPETITION L. 272–98 (2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1855004 (comparing
national laws regarding employees’ inventions and inventors’ compensation in Germany,
France, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom); Peberdy & Strowel, supra note 14
(same).
46
See Wolk, supra note 45, at 279–92.
47
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO PATENT REPORT:
STATISTICS ON WORLDWIDE PATENT ACTIVITIES (2007) [hereinafter WIPO PATENT
REPORT] (noting that patent applications “are a reliable indicator of underlying inventive
activity); see also WHITE HOUSE STUDY, supra note 1, at 2–6 (commenting that on
regional innovation clusters, evidence shows that areas with strong clusters perform
better economically than areas without these clusters; they have higher job growth, higher
wage growth, more businesses, and a higher rate of patenting. The first is the proxy
method, where rather than measuring innovation directly, patents or spending on R&D
are tracked as a proxy for the level or rate of change of innovation).
48
See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO IP FACTS AND FIGURES
14, 17 (2012) (showing the United States as the country with the most patent applications
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In order to accurately analyze ways of improving the level of
innovation, one must consider not only the total number of patent
applications, but also other features, such as the number of patent
applications per capita, the number of non-resident patent filings as
a percentage of total filings, the ratio of patent applications versus
accepted patents, and the level of investment in research and
development. Estimation of U.S. innovation according to these
criteria leads to problematic results. 49
One of the central problems is that the current IP regime risks
failing to effectively incentivize employee invention. In countries
where the employee’s entitlement to more rights is guaranteed up
front and unequivocally, there is a high level of inventiveness. 50
Germany and the Scandinavian states, for example, grant their
employees, apart from their salary, priority right on their own
inventions; that is, employee-inventors, who transfer the rights to
their invention, are awarded with special monetary consideration. 51
Even though intellectual property products, developed in the
workplace by employees, are given to the employer, the process of
transferring rights in employee inventions includes paying
consideration to the employee-inventor for his or her role in the
creative process.
The Nobel Prize Laureate in Economics, Joseph Stiglitz, had
already expressed his concern regarding the possible slowdown in
economic development of the U.S. at the end of the twentieth

representing 26.6% of worldwide totals); see also WIPO PATENT REPORT, supra note 47,
at 12.
49
See WIPO PATENT REPORT, supra note 47, at 16 (showing that the U.S. percentage
of resident patent fillings was only 53%, whereas 47% were non-resident patent fillings);
see also Parker, supra note 7, at 603 (noting that in 1980, only 38.9% were issued to nonUS citizens or corporations and that ten years before that, only 25% of all patents granted
in the United States were issued to foreign entities); WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INDICATORS, supra note 2.
50
THE GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2012: STRONGER INNOVATION LINKAGES FOR
GLOBAL GROWTH, xviii (Soumitra Dutta, Ed., INSEAD & WIPO, 2012), available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/economics/gii/gii_2012.pdf
[hereinafter GII 2012]. Countries such as Sweden, Finland, United Kingdom,
Netherlands and Denmark that guarantee rights or special compensation to employed
inventors achieved a higher position than the US, which was ranked as the 10th place.
51
See Peberdy & Strowel, supra note 14.
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century. 52 The recent recession proved just how prescient his claim
was. The U.S. government invests a tremendous amount in
research and development. 53 Despite this, according to Stiglitz, the
U.S. occupies a low place on the ladder of innovation as compared
to some European countries. 54 Economic development stems from
three sources: increased capital, improved human capital
(measured by the quality of employees), and technological
changes. These factors are all closely related. During a time of
economic slowdown, the first factor is neutralized temporarily. As
such, the second factor becomes all the more important in
influencing economic development. Human capital is, therefore,
what can be expected to respond positively to a change in the
allocation of intellectual property in places of work, as this is
where most inventions in the U.S. are developed. 55
51F

52F

53F

54F

Other scholars have expressed similar concerns regarding the
relatively low rate of patents per capita registered by resident
workers. 56 This phenomenon, which even during times of
prosperity, has not succeeded in generating reforms in the U.S.,
5F

52

See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 342−44, 347−48 (3d ed.
2000).
53
See WHITE HOUSE STUDY, supra note 1, at 3–12 (indicating that, of the non-defense
federal budget, 49% went to the National Institute of Health (NIH) for fiscal years 20092011 and that there was a constant increase in scientific R&D federal funding since
1986); see also ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/2011_erp_full.pdf (last visited
Dec. 10, 2012) (“In 2009, the Obama Administration put in place the largest funding
increase for basic science in U.S. history, with an $18.3 billion contribution from the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act . . . recent studies find that research tax credits
translate dollar-for-dollar into increases in current research spending, especially over the
longer run as businesses develop their research enterprises.”).
54
See STIGLITZ, supra note 52 (noting that the research and development as might be
expressed, for example, in the number of requests for patents per capita. Defense
purposes constitute 57% of the entire research and development budget. Thus, the
investment rate in the U.S. for purposes other than defense is inadequate).
55
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
56
See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 23, at 129−30 (“During the past decade, commentators
on the state of American technology have noted a decline in the rate of innovation in
America. Imports of technology-intensive manufactured products have been growing
faster than exports of these products, contributing to a serious balance of payments
deficit. Foreign inventors have increased their share of newly issued American patents at
the expense of domestic inventors. In addition, the national rate of production of
patented inventions has decreased, whether measured per dollar of research funding or
per research worker.”).
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becomes far more acute during a time of crisis. Some time ago it
had already been forecasted:
The United States has a declining patent balance
and is less patent productive per dollar than are
many foreign countries. Given that technological
innovation is one of the United States’ most
important economic resources, this country cannot
allow other countries to continue carving out
increasingly larger shares of the market for
technology. 57
The promotion of new technologies is an important political
goal for the governments of many states; therefore, they should
adopt a policy that encourages productivity and innovation.
The current policy relies on a one-sided justification without
acknowledging that utilitarian arguments are far from monolithic
and without recognizing a number of other possibilities.
Insufficient attention has been given to some important factors in
the law and economics discourse. For example, the implications of
the uncertainty surrounding the circumstances of transferring rights
from the employed inventor to the employer before any invention
has been developed 58 or to the high tech era, which requires
investment at early stages, such as for start-ups, 59 which will be
discussed in the following sections. 60 The need to increase
57

Parker, supra note 7, at 603; see also WHITE HOUSE STUDY, supra note 1, at 1−7 and
1−8 (commenting on recent reports which “indicated that the United States had made
little or no progress in its competitiveness since 1999 and now ranks fourth in innovationbased competitiveness”).
58
See discussion infra Part II; see also United States v. Dubilier, 298 U.S. 178, 188
(1933) (noting that the reason courts are reluctant “to imply or infer an agreement by the
employee to assign his patent is due to a recognition of the peculiar nature of the act of
invention . . . .”).
59
See MINN. DEP’T OF EMP’T AND ECON. DEV., A GUIDE TO BIOTECHNOLOGY FINANCE
(2005), available at http://cdm16105.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16105coll5/
id/2425 (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) for an example in the biotechnology field where
investments are made at the early commercialization stage of biotechnology entities.
This guide defines early commercialization stage according to my own perception of
start-ups; see also Shannon H. Hedvat, A New Age of Pro-Employer Rights: Are
Automatic Assignments the Standard?, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 817, 823 (2011) (noting that
many significant inventions are being developed at and supported by start-ups).
60
See discussion infra Part II.
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creative activity within the workplace is not the only conclusion
that must be drawn in order to criticize and change the current
policy. The tendency of employers to amass patents, instead of
developing them, is another anti-innovation result of the privileges
granted to them under the current regime.
2. Employers as “Patent Trolls”
The allocation of rights to employers under the current regime
may give the employer more rights than are actually required and
in a manner that impairs the efficient use of the product for the
public interest. The employer’s status as the “decider” in the
product development process enables it to determine: (i) who is
entitled to work with certain ideas to be developed into final
products, (ii) the conditions of that work, and (iii) for our purposes,
the rights in relation to the product, including those that will be
received by subordinates—if any at all. Further, the employer
controls the ultimate fate of the employee’s invention. 61 That is,
an employer can decide whether or not to develop, market, or use
the product at all and/or to use it to sue (or, generally, fight
against) others. Such activity by entities, commonly referred to as
“patent trolls,” have generated mass discussion. 62 There are many
reasons why firms submerge patents and avoid developing them
into commercial products, oftentimes against the public interest.
Firms store patents in their “drawers” in order to prevent
competitors from developing similar ones, to wipe out smaller
entities, or to focus on an already-developed, marketed product and
avoid the expense of developing a new one. 63

61

See Merges, supra note 16, at 2219–22 (noting that patents are used by corporate
entities as part of the corporate patent strategy for “blocking patents” to counter an
industrial rival instead for the progress of science and useful arts).
62
See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 2012, at A1 (“[T]he marketplace for new ideas has been corrupted by software patents
used as destructive weapons . . . . In the smart phone industry alone, as much as $20
billion was spent on patent litigation and patent purchases in the last two years - an
amount equal to eight Mars rover missions.”).
63
See Julie S. Turner, Comment: The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a
Theory of Efficient Infringement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 186−87, 194−96 (1998)
(criticizing the decisions of firms, supported by court decisions, to avoid developing
efficient patents while focusing on less developed products that they already produced, as
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Although literature has extensively discussed the subject of
patent trolls, its connection to the employer-employee relationship
has not been deeply mentioned. Giving the employer, as opposed
to the employee-inventor, full control over the product is a key
factor that enables the employer to submerge patents while
simultaneously prohibiting its development by others. When the
employer fails to exploit a product for its own purposes of
maintaining market power or ensuring the continued success of an
already-existing product—goals which may be opposed to those of
its employees—the public necessarily loses access to valuable
intellectual property goods. Thus, the current pro-employer regime
creates distorted incentives for firms with numerous products
already on the market to hold back newer, more innovative ones.
II. TRANSFER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER
TRANSACTIONAL UNCERTAINTY
The subject of pre-invention transactional uncertainty has not
yet been deeply explored in present literature. 64 This uncertainty is
particularly prominent in the area of intellectual property, when
there is no certainty whether ideas can be transferred into products
or whether these products will succeed at all. This uncertainty is,
for example, endemic in the realm of patents, particularly in the
development of medicines. When the actual creation of the
product, its final particulars, its economic worth, and whether it
will gain patent protection is not known in advance, a situation
fraught with risk emerges. This section argues that an employee’s
uncertainty as to the results of his or her creative efforts and his or
well as in using the patent as a sword against competitors that want to develop a
competitor product).
64
See Steven Cherensky, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors,
Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property and Personhood, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 597
(1993) (discussing the term “pre-invention”); see also Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the
“Fuel of Interests” from the “Fire of Genius”: Law and the Employee-Inventor, 18301930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1131 (1998) (regarding employees who transfer their
rights in future products to their employer under their employment contract); Robert
Penchina, The Creative Commissioner: Commissioned Works Under the Copyright Act of
1976, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 373, 377 (1987) (concluding that the current law regarding
works made-for-hire is confused and needs revision); Birnhack, supra note 19, at 125,
154−55 (finding that the employer bears risk associated with making work).
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her rights in the final product (or his or her knowledge that he or
she will not have any such rights) coalesce to discourage him or
her from going the extra mile in making a significant innovative
effort.
A. The Problems of Pre-Invention Uncertainty
Uncertainty is one of the central features of the contractual
stage during which the employee knowingly or unknowingly
waives his or her rights in future intellectual products from the
outset of his or her employment. 65 Such waivers are often
sweeping and quite broad. In a contractual arrangement known as
a “pre-invention assignment agreement,” the employee makes a
full transfer of rights to the employer. 66
64F

65F

Courts have typically upheld these contracts. 67 It bears noting
that the employee’s advance waiver of rights at the pre-invention
stage differs from the employee’s de facto transfer of an existing
intellectual product, which has its own specific problems. The
main problem in this regard is that, the employee usually has no
knowledge of what he or she is waiving. 68 These engagements are
made before employees are even aware of whether they will, in
fact, produce anything or how much effort and investment will be
required. When the parties negotiate over rights in an invention or
existing creation, neither party is fully aware of what they are
6F

67F

65

See RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND
COMMERCE (2000); Cherensky, supra note 64, at 617 (focusing on personality theory).
66
See Parker A. Howell, Whose Invention Is It Anyway? Employee InventionAssignment Agreements And Their Limits, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 79, 80 (2012)
(“Language in employment contracts requiring workers to assign to their employers any
inventions conceived of during employment has become commonplace as businesses
grow high-tech and experience frequent exchanges of employees.”).
67
See cases cited supra note 14; see also Howell, supra note 66, at 81 (The “article
examines the limits on contractual pre-invention assignment, using the Mattel litigation
as a case study” and finding that even though limitations on pre-invention agreements
exist, in some states, courts enforce pre-invention assignment agreements in favor of
employers); Merges, supra note 19, at 7−8.
68
See Evelyn D. Pisegna-Cook, Ownership Rights of Employee Inventions: The Role
of Preinvention Assignment Agreement and State Statutes, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
163, 163−64 (1994) (“[T]he assignment of pre-invention rights, as opposed to the
assignment of an existing invention, presents special contractual problems. Since the
invention has not yet materialized, the assignors or employees enter into an agreement
without knowing exactly what they are potentially giving up.”).
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receiving or what is being waived, for the employee transfers a
collection of abstract rights that only reflects anticipation.
Agreements of this kind can damage the creative process and the
inventions themselves because they detract from the initial
motivation to create. Furthermore, even if an employee’s efforts
bear fruit, he or she cannot be sure that others will necessarily
derive any benefit from his or her product.
Employers, on the other hand, have far more bargaining power
in the initial contracting stages, which can all but ensure a
complete transfer of rights. They also possess the financial
resources for funding, research, and development—they only lack
resources for creativity.
Pre-invention contractual transfer
arrangements tend to make sweeping transfers of all rights from
employed inventors to employers. 69 In addition, pre-invention
contractual transfer arrangements sometimes contain provisions
known as “trailer clauses.” 70

A recent economic study by Uri Weiss shows that uncertainty
relating to extreme power discrepancies, in a manner that operates
to the detriment of the weaker party, also detracts from the
efficiency of the transaction. 71 The claim is that legal uncertainty
is not neutral—it influences the “risk points” of the parties. To the
70F

69

See Howell, supra note 66, at 80–81 (such pre-invention assignment clauses may
purport to give an employer ownership of all an employee’s inventions, whereas statutes
in some states, including California, Washington, and Minnesota, carve out significant
limitations to these agreements).
70
See Marc B. Hershovitz, Unhitching the Trailer Clause: The Rights of Inventive
Employees and their Employers, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 187, 188 (1995) (“A trailer clause
is a contractual provision in which the employee-inventor agrees to assign his or her
entire interest in any invention he creates during a period following the termination of the
employment relationship.”).
71
See Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Appealability, HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF
JERUSALEM, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RATIONALITY 1 (2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1688877 (last visited Dec. 21, 2011) (“There are sides that gain
from increasing legal uncertainty and others that lose from it. Legal uncertainty leads to
regressive settlements: a shift from a more certain legal regime to a less certain one
transfers weal from risk-averse parties to risk-neutral parties, via the settlements.”).
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extent that one party is more risk averse, he or she will feel more
threatened and agree in advance to a compromise that is more
favorable to the risk-taking party. 72 Such uncertainty generates
regressive, inefficient agreements; as the uncertainty grows, so
does its effects. Given that risk aversion is a function of wealth,
legal uncertainty is anathema to the financially weaker party.
Research further shows that, where there are chances for an equal
allocation of rights, such an allocation would not take place in an
uncertain transaction (when the rules and likely results of litigation
are uncertain). 73
The conclusion is that under uncertain transactions even the
mere possibility of equal allocation between parties, who hold
different attitudes to risk, will not result in actual equal allocation
of rights and goods. The sum that the risk-averse party will agree
to accept in lieu of litigation will be lower than the minimum price
that the risk indifferent party would be prepared to pay for a
waiver. 74 Therefore, employees who are usually risk averse will
seek to diminish the risk under uncertain conditions and hence,
agree to lower consideration in rights or payment than they could
have actually bargained for in certain conditions and with equal
bargaining power. A central mechanism for coping with legal
uncertainty is by “freely” reaching a settlement agreement, one of
the advantages of which is the neutralization of risk. A settlement
agreement provides a definite sum that provides a substitute to the
uncertainty regarding the amount of the award. A settlement
agreement thus serves as quasi insurance. A party sensitive to
uncertainty will convert that uncertainty into the settlement
agreement. Concededly, the weaker party will receive a definite
sum that is lower than the sum he or she might have received as a
result of litigation, but because he or she is weak and risk averse,
the definite sum is preferable to the possibility of a higher sum.
Furthermore, the weaker party prefers “to pay” a higher sum of
money in order to remove the threat of litigation. Thus, to the
71F

72F

73F

72

See id. at 1, 6−9 (noting that a risk-neutral side actually sells an “insurance policy”
to the risk-averse side; the higher the legal uncertainty, the higher the risk, and hence, the
risk-averse side will agree to pay more in order to neutralize the legal risk).
73
See id. at 2−3.
74
See id. at 1, 6–9 (exploring appeals as a form of settlement to avoid litigation).
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extent that the individual is more risk averse, he or she will be
prepared to purchase a more expensive insurance policy from his
or her rival. As a result, the risk-averse party loses more by reason
of his or her uncertainty, whereas the risk indifferent party profits
thereby, and the profit margin of the latter increases in direct
proportion to the degree of uncertainty. 75
Weiss’s study has direct implications upon my claims in this
Article.
Under conditions of extreme uncertainty, it may
reasonably be presumed that the employee will undervalue his or
her rights and be prepared to receive far less in
consideration/compensation. 76 In other words, it is expected that
the employee-inventor will transfer or sell all rights in return for a
“pot of lentils.” The price of the transaction, especially at the preinvention stage, is unclear, and hence the waiver is likely to be
uninformed. The conclusions of this study support my proposed
confer
employer
model, discussed in Part VI, These
whichclauses
critiques
the the
pre-invention
with
waiver.
rights in intellectual products that were created in the course
of the employee’s work, even if not directly in the work for which
B. or
Allocation
of Risks under
Uncertainty
he
she was employed
and even
if created after the termination of
his or
hertraditional
period of explanation
employment.of risk allocation in the workplace
The
is that the employer and the employee are located at different
places on the spectrum—one which extends from neutrality to
concern for risk. 77 The employer is closer to the extreme of
neutrality concerning risks and uncertainty (risk neutrality)
whereas the employee is closer to the extreme characterized by risk
aversion (fear of risk and avoidance of uncertainty). 78 The
contractual connection between the employee and employer with
75F

76F

7F

75

See id. at 9–15, 19–21 (asserting that the weaker the person, the more he or she
prefers a lump sum over risk-taking).
76
See Merges, supra note 19, at 16 (noting that in a position of uncertainty about
future inventions and, “given the risk aversion typical of individuals, an employee would
likely place a relatively low ex ante value on the right to this compensation.”).
77
See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 43–48 (4th ed. 2004)
(noting that employees are risk averse whereas employers are risk neutral).
78
See Birnhack, supra note 19, at 140 (presenting the traditional approach to risk
allocation by determining that, “the employer is in a better position to undertake the risks
associated with producing [and commercializing the] work, [since the] typical production
firm does not invest in one work only”); see also Merges, supra note 19, at 16 (stating
that “employers . . . as a class, are more efficient bearers of this risk”).
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respect to the development of intellectual products is characterized,
as mentioned above, by uncertainty. 79
According to the traditional approach, the employee’s salary
usually represents the willingness of employees to exchange their
risk about the future for stable, lower payment and thus,
externalizing the risk-averse employee’s costs to the employer.
However, the payment represents the employee’s waiver of the
chance for future profits at the price of ongoing payments in the
present. 80 Being averse to risk, the employee will prefer a lower
income on a permanent and certain basis over a higher, yet
uncertain, potential gain. Alternative payment terms with inherent
uncertainty, such as percentages of product sales, while waiving a
permanent salary, are generally anathema to the risk averse. 81 The
employer “buys” intellectual property rights in the product because
he assumes the risk involved in the creation, development, and
marketing of IP products. The employee is regarded as having
“sold” his or her rights in return for a salary. 82 Hence, the sides

79

See Merges, supra note 19, at 16 (“[T]he parties to such a contract would have to
sign it before any details of the invention were known – indeed, before anyone knew
whether a particular employee would ever invent anything at all.”).
80
See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 130 (3d ed.
2003).
81
The risk-averse person prefers to give up a certain amount rather than face the
unknown. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 77, at 38–51, 53 (“One of the most important
behavioral implications of risk aversion are that people will pay money to avoid having to
face uncertain outcomes. In other words, a risk-averse person would rather have a lower
certain income than a higher uncertain income.”); see also Birnhack, supra note 19, at
154-55 (adopting the traditional approach that there is a trade-off of risks between
employer and employee; employee chooses not to be independent and to work for
specific employer); CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION
AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800-1930, 178–88 (Univ. N.C.
Press 2009) (arguing that modern intellectual property law provides for unprecedented
formalization of corporate power over all aspects of employment and production).
82
See Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 185 Cal. App.3d 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th D. 1986) (arguing
that the rights regarding works which employees develop belong to the firm that invested,
either directly or indirectly, in the development of that invention); Merges, supra note 16,
at 30–31 (“[B]y taking a salary, R&D personnel are revealing a preference for relatively
low-risk rewards.”).
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virtually trade risks. 83 The employer, for its part, “buys” the future
risk from the employee for potential future rights in IP goods. 84
This traditional risk analysis favoring the employer is,
however, subject to a number of criticisms. 85 First, the risk model
described is only appropriate for employees who are employed to
invent (ETI). Even then, its individual applicability should be
examined on an ad-hoc basis. It should not be applied to general
non-ETI employees such as engineers or doctors. The model has
no applicability to those employees, as there is no risk-allocation
between employer and employee with respect to the invention.
Thus, a distinction should be made between an ETI employee and
a general employee whose salary is not provided as a reward for
inventive or creative activity. In these cases, the “risk trading”
argument does not apply.
The second criticism of the risk trading argument is that it
ignores the risks that employee-inventors (including ETI) take
upon themselves when developing their internal resources in favor
of their employers. Both the employee and the employer take a
risk at the pre-invention stage before the development of a product.
The employer provides economic activity whereas the employee
specializes in inventive-creative activity. Attention is usually
focused on risks that employers take. 86 However, the employee
invests in one asset only—his or her own human capital. When the
employee chooses a central place of work, he or she is taking risk
by investing all of his or her human capital in this one place. As an
employee, he or she is limited in his or her ability to spread the
investments in a number of companies. 87 The employer’s
investment, on the other hand, is spread among a greater number of
83

See Orbach, supra note 19, at 37–38 (citing trade risk as an important factor in
evaluating the efficient regulation of service work).
84
Id.
85
See Parker, supra note 7, at 627 (raising the criticism that inventors, as well as nonR&D employees, run the risk that employers will either fail or refuse to develop an
invention).
86
See POLINSKY, supra note 80 (discussing the limitation of liability afforded to
shareholders, which both allows and encourages them to take risks in business activity).
87
See Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for
Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL. J. ECON. 605, 606 (1981) (asserting that because
“human capital cannot be traded in competitive markets,” managers may diversify
employment risk through mergers).
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factors; employees, machines, equipment and development. 88 This
is most obvious with large and well-established employers and less
so among small and medium enterprises. When employeeinventors pass their ideas on to the specific employer, they run the
risk of the employer not sufficiently valuing their ideas and failing
to develop them. This may hold up promotion at work or affect
future economic potential. From the moment of transferring an
idea to the employer and fixing it in an external medium, the
employee loses his or her rights in his or her own thoughts under
the current regime.
Third, the risk-trading model does not necessarily ensure
optimal efficiency. Because it bears the brunt of the economic
risk, the employer may prefer not to secure the employee’s rights
in the product or its subsequent royalties, even at the expense of a
low level of employee investment and, therefore, a lower level of
productivity.
Fourth, the traditional risk analysis favoring the employer may
no longer be applicable in a start-up era where employees
themselves may be highly risk-seeking rather than risk-averse.
The assumption that employees are risk averse mischaracterizes a
large group of employee-inventors who choose to leave a firm and
strike out on their own, developing products by themselves or with
other entities. In the new world of tech start-ups, these can easily
gather investment and establish their own firms. In many cases,
the likelihood of developing the ideas into tradable products is
greater than the allocation of these ideas to firms. However, the
pro-employer tendency does not encourage cooperation between
employees and their former employer.
As start-ups grow in success, it is likely that more employees
will turn to investors and seek to develop products themselves. An
analysis of employer-employee risk allocation is far from precise
under an economic framework wherein economic investments may
be made at a relatively early stage of the development process. A
large portion of the modern “start-up” economy in the
88

See generally Thorstein Veblen, On the Nature of Capital: Investment, Intangivle
Assets, and the Pecuniary Magnate, 23 Q. J. ECON. 104 (1908), available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1883967 (discussing the nature of investment in both tangible
and intangible assets toward the goal of capital gain).
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technological realm is based on small and medium size
entrepreneurs. Most, if not all of them, were once employees in
other companies, but they are not risk averse as demonstrated from
their entrepreneurial willingness. 89 Thus, the theory of rights
allocation being a function of risk allocation does not apply to
them. Rather, these entrepreneurs should be rewarded, instead of
punished for their efforts.
The distinction between the entrepreneur-employee who
welcomes risk and the risk-averse employee—for whom ensuring
an appropriate salary is more efficient in comparison to the
allocation of property rights—is by no means simple. In cases
involving entrepreneurial employees, the granting of property
rights should be viewed as the desirable way to give risk-seeking,
creative workers property rights in their products.
Rethinking the prevailing norm from this perspective reveals
new opportunities for development of innovative products by
simply allocating rights in a new product developed by a former
employee after he or she has left the firm to that former employee,
even when the ideas that led to the invention are rooted at the
former place of employment. 90 In other words, former employees
should be credited with property rights, as new entrepreneurs, for
ideas they have developed themselves. Courts should adopt new
policy regarding non-compete clauses in employment agreements
allocating ideas of employees to their former employer. I have
chosen to call this rule the “escape clause.” In other words, in
situations where the “escape clause” would apply, courts would
simply strike down the relevant provisions of the pre-invention
contract that endows a former employer with the rights to a
product developed after an employee has left the firm.
8F

89F

C. The Efficient User
I have argued throughout this Part that, although the traditional
law and economics approach views the employer as the more
89

ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A
HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 3–4 (2003) (defining the Silicon Valley as a high
velocity labor market characterized by frequent mobility and entrepreneurship paths).
90
I further claim that the service invention rule today should be reconsidered in order
to promote more cooperation between the employee-inventors and the (former) employer.
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efficient user/holder of patent rights under conditions of
uncertainty, 91 there may be cases, instead, where the employee is
the efficient exploiter of an intellectual property product. 92
Allocation of property rights to employees may be more efficient
where it concerns the recycling of works. The rationale is to
spread the cost of funding new IP products based on former ones.
Examples, taken mainly from copyright regime, include teachers,
poets, planners, and architects whose ability to revise and rework
their creations means that the full conferral of the rights to them
will be more economically efficient (as opposed to being required
to receive the approval of the IP owner each time anew). 93 In these
cases, as is the practice among architects, the final client is
“subsidized” by the previous client. 94 An architect will create a
plan for a new client based on an existing plan, which he or she
had already invested in creating. 95 These examples also apply to
inventors, for whom new inventions or new modifications are built
on top of previous ones. A scientist or engineer, for example, can
adapt his or her invention to new situations with greater efficiency
than the institution or those on its behalf. Thus, the allocation of
rights to the employer may prevent the employees from using the
products they developed when moving forward. However, this
rationale should not apply to an employer who utilizes the products

91

See supra text accompanying notes 76–84.
See Posner, supra note 19, at 37–45 (reasoning that copyright laws protect the cost
of creating subsequent works).
93
See Orbach, supra note 19, at 57–58 (suggesting that sometimes the author, and not
the transferee, is the more efficient user of the work).
94
Architects generally license their plans to builders or developers, usually for a single
use, retaining all rights to the design and drawings. See WERNER SABO, LEGAL GUIDE TO
AIA DOCUMENTS 123-124 (5th ed. 2013), citing LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia
Homes of Nevada, 434 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2006) (granting preliminary injunction against
a developer who reused an architect’s plans without permission, in breach of the written
agreement between the architect and the client).
95
It is a common practice for architects to re-use their prior work, and the practice is
typically protected by contract. However, clients who seek (and think they are paying
for) exclusivity are sometimes surprised by the practice. See ARCHINECT DISCUSSION
FORUM:
Our
Custom
Plans
Resold . . .
Is
This
Ethical?
at
http://archinect.com/forum/thread/65444889/our-custom-plans-resold-is-this-ethical (last
visited Nov. 7, 2013).
92
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in an effective and efficient manner. In such a case it is more
effective to transfer the property right to the employer. 96
This compels a rethinking of the arrangement in view of the
doctrine of the most efficient user. One solution may lie in the ab
initio vesting of property rights in the employee, which would be
passed to the employer subject to certain conditions, such as the
cancellation of such transfer and a restoration to the employee in
the event of the employer’s failure to exploit the product. A
number of proposals were submitted to Congress to enact a law
under which the employee would receive the property rights in his
or her invention in certain circumstances. 97 For example, proposed
amendments to American Patent law suggested that inventions
would belong to the employee who conceived it in situations
where, inter alia, the employer failed to file an application to
register a patent (a constructive abandonment). 98 This solution
would streamline the development of products and the use thereof,
giving the employee an incentive to produce and promote the
product the employee created. Mechanisms that abrogate IP rights
by reason of non-use on the part of their owners are accepted in
other areas of IP. 99 A trademark owner, for example, can
“abandon” his or her mark and thus lose rights to it. 100 It may also
be possible to consider a proposal incorporating the idea of an
“efficient breach,” thus allowing employees who develop an
intellectual product the rights to that product while ensuring that
the employer is properly compensated. 101
95F

96F

97F

98F

9F

10F

96

In the well-known Tasini judgment, concerning the rights to publish journalists’
articles in other media, the majority rejected the opinion concerning the efficient user.
See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001) (reasoning that the
effective exploiter can acquire the rights from the less efficient side in the free market). I
suggest that the employer can buy the rights in a free market from the employee-inventor
if the employer is the better user.
97
See, e.g., The Bayh-Dole Act, H.R. 6933, 96th Cong. (1980) (providing inventors
with intellectual property rights when working pursuant to a federal research funding
contract or grant).
98
Kastenmeier Bill Oct. 13, 1981 (97th H.R. 4732); Katsenmeier Bill June 17,
1982 (97th H.R.6636) (Resubmitted as June 13, 1983 98th H.R. 3285).
99
See, e.g., The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (codifying the conditions under which
a mark will be deemed to have been abandoned).
100
Id.
101
See Turner, supra note 63, at 196–201 (promoting efficient infringement through the
use of liability rules).
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This Section of the Article focused on the uncertainty
surrounding the transaction of IP rights from the employed
inventor to the employer. The next will continue this discussion
focusing innovatively on “Principal-Agent” theory.
III. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY
In order to decide on the most efficient policy regarding
workplace inventions, one must look at the special characteristics
of the workplace. We can analogize to another model that has
gained attention in the corporate law literature, but not yet in the
context discussed: the Principal-Agent relationship. For our
purposes, the employer is the principal and the employee is the
agent. A principal-agent relationship is most often characterized as
a “contract under which one or more (principal(s)) engage another
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which
involves delegating some decision making authority to the
agent.” 102
A problematic situation arises when the employee, as an agent,
prefers his or her own personal interests over those of the
employer. Take for example the case of an employee in an icecream shop. The employee might prefer to eat the ice-cream, close
the shop as early as possible, and bring ice-cream to his or her
friends, rather than to safeguard the employer’s interests,
especially when the employee is not subject to any supervision.
The fear is that the employee may prefer activities that
minimize the degree of effort required while maximizing personal
benefits. Understandably, the employee may well prefer his or her
own interest at the expense of the interest the employee is
supposed to represent, and the greater the gap between these
interests, the greater the conflict. 103 Additional characteristics of
this gap are the discrepancies between the employer and the
employee in their levels of knowledge and the lack of visibility in
the activity of the employee. Specifically in the context of
employee-inventions, the employer does not always know how
102

See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
103
See id.
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much the employee invested—particularly intellectually—in the
development of an invention even though it has been developed at
the workplace.
This problem founded on the agent’s interests exists in the area
of corporate law, but I believe that the problem becomes most
acute in the context of employee-inventors. The distinction
between the employer who carries out the business activity and the
employee who creates or invents gives rise to the concern that the
employee will avoid the development and creation at the level,
quality, and quantity expected of him. This conflict may be
expressed in the lack of efficiency in the development of products,
the result of which will be a decrease in the quantity and quality of
intellectual products developed in the workplace. The employeeinventor may make a minimal investment of effort (similar to the
ice-cream seller in the previous example) and may develop a
minimal level of intellectual products (only the degree which is
required to prevent him or her from being fired) and then likely to
tend to his or her own interests. When discussing employed
inventors, it might be impossible in many cases to examine the
depth of the mental-intellectual investment required for purposes
of development, creation, and monitoring. Further, the more
workers there are on a team, the more difficult it becomes to
monitor the individual contribution that each one of them makes to
the work.
In the context of intellectual property, the Principal-Agent
problem concretizes the concern that the employee-inventor will
prefer personal interests over the property interests of his or her
employer and therefore, is not as incentivized to create to his or her
full potential. The solution to this problem stresses the importance
of conferring rights or other benefits to the employee not just as a
means of promoting development, but also to block obstructions
that may interfere with that development process (for example,
preferring other tasks). The solution is anchored in the concept
that it is more efficient to ensure optimal innovation than to bear
the dangers attendant to inefficiency in the development of
products. Jensen and Meckling suggested a number of solutions to
the Principal-Agency problem, which they referred to as “agency
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costs.” 104 These costs include monitoring costs, bonding costs and
residual costs (the reduction in welfare experienced by the
principal as a result of this divergence). 105 As mentioned, these
solutions merit discussion in the present context.
One solution to the representative problem is to tighten up
monitoring mechanisms. 106 This solution, however, is not
effective in the context of inventors and creators due to the
invisibility of their mental investment. The installation of a video
camera or supervision of computer usage, for example, would
provide little insight into how much thought and mental effort were
invested in the ideas that preceded development (such as the
reading and understanding of material or the depth of thought and
intellectual effort that were invested). Another method of
monitoring the work of employee-inventors could be indirect
monitoring through evaluation of the eventual products
developed. 107 However, the problem here is that, when there is a
group of employee-inventors, the visibility of the investment of
each one of the group’s individual employees would be even less
apparent and therefore, hard to evaluate and monitor. In sum, the
mechanisms for monitoring development are less effective when
the creative-inventive part of the product is significant and the
development team comprises numerous employees.
The alternative mechanism for solving the conflict of interests
within employed inventors’ work is the bonding mechanism,
which links the employee to the product. 108 By connecting the
employee to the product, the personal interest of the employee
becomes the development of the product, and this “bonding”
reduces the gap between the employee’s interest and the
employer’s interest. 109 As a result of the “bond,” the employee
104

Id.
Id.
106
Id. (introducing monitoring as a solution to the representative problem).
107
Toby Marshall Egan, Factors Influencing Individual Creativity in the Workplace:
An Examination of Quantitative Empirical Research, 7 ADVANCES IN DEVELOPING
HUMAN RESOURCES 169 (2005).
108
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 102, at 325 (discussing bonding as a solution to the
representative problem).
109
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 108, at 325–26 (describing the phenomenon in
terms of “bonding costs” and using other examples).
105
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becomes more committed to the employer and the work itself.
Having a personal interest in the work, the employee operates in
order to maximize his or her personal interest in a manner that may
be consistent with the interests of society as a whole. 110 Giving a
bonus to the employee for each sale is an example of a method to
spur the bonding that firms should desire to create. Conferral of
rights in intellectual inventions to employee-inventors can also
encourage them to promote the development process and invest
their best efforts in doing so. In addition, it reduces the danger of
employees channeling their efforts towards the promotion of their
own interests, such as alternative projects.
The payment of salary only will not necessarily solve these
problems because, within the context of employee-inventions, an
employee might work only to maintain this salary without putting
in any extra work. An effective mechanism must connect the
employee to the product itself. As more rights are conferred upon
the employee, the inventor’s personal interest in product
development will increase. However, conferral of rights must take
into consideration additional factors. Agency costs must be less
than the benefit bestowed upon the employer. If one gives all of
the rights to the employee, it is clear that the employer will lose all
interest it had in product development, which will inevitably come
to a standstill. I conclude that consideration must also be had for
the parties’ respective degrees of risk aversion because the
development and commercialization of intellectual products
involves a significant degree of uncertainty. 111
In summary, the Principal-Agency model may provide further
insight in developing an appropriate solution to the problem of
how to best ensure an employee-inventor can fulfill his maximum
potential in developing intellectual property. Specifically, giving
the employee incentives intrinsically linked to the product itself,
preferably through property rights, aside from the payment of a
regular salary will help ensure that an employee’s interest can stay
aligned with an employer’s.
110

Carolyn Wiley, What Motivates Employees According to Over 40 Years of
Motivation Surveys,18 INT’L J. MANPOWER 263–80 (1997) (noting that employees
overwhelmingly selected “good wages” as their top motivator).
111
See discussion supra Part II.

172

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:140

Allocation of options and equity shares in the employer’s firm
to employees may also provide such an incentive. A number of
arguments have, however, been made against the offering of
employee shares or options as a solution to the Principal-Agency
problem. 112 The value of the shares, for example, is not
necessarily connected to the performance of those entitled to them.
The commercial value of shares depends upon the commercial
success of the company, which is only tenuously related to the
specific activity of the employee, that is, development of
intellectual products. 113 Even if there is a certain connection
between commercial activity and the end-product, activities like
the marketing and sale of the product are not within the control of
the employee who developed the product. In that situation, the
value of the shares will not reflect the commercial potential of the
product, and as such, the incentive itself will bear only a tenuous
relation to the product, rendering it ineffective. 114
The conclusion emerging from these critiques, in my view, is
that from the outset, a connection should be established between
the employee and his or her outputs. In the realm of intellectual
property, this means rewarding inventors by giving them property
rights and/or royalties to a degree and in a manner that reflects and
is linked to the success of the products developed or to be
developed.
The foregoing discussion of the importance of analyzing the
employee/employer relationship from the principal/agent
perspective leads to the conclusion that the bonding solution
should be one of the main components involved in shaping a new
policy for enhancing innovative productivity.

112

See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 16–17 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9784, 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9784.pdf (asserting that options are often an inefficient way
to attract, retain, and motivate executives).
113
Id. at 16.
114
An additional claim concerns the difficulty of quantifying the value of options
conferred upon the employee. See id. at 7-9 (describing the complex tax and accounting
rules of stock options).
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IV. WHOSE INCENTIVES SHOULD WE PROMOTE?
A. Rethinking Employers’ Incentives
In discussing rights allocation for employee inventions
developed in the workplace, it must be stressed that investment in
future products is a function, not only of the employer’s resources,
but is also a reflection of the employee’s investment and expenses,
such as intellectual effort or academic knowledge. The economic
justifications for both sides’ investment in product development
stems from the assumption that the anticipated benefit of the
product, although still unknown, will be greater than its present
and anticipated expenses. In formulating a policy for the
appropriate allocation of rights, we assume that each party has an
incentive to incur the necessary expenses under uncertain
conditions regarding future outcomes. 115 On the one hand, if all
rights are given to the employee, the employer lacks the incentive
to invest in necessary infrastructure vital to the creative process.
On the other hand, giving all of the rights to the employer leaves
the employee with a diminished incentive to make any exceptional
future investment apart from maintaining a salary based on
minimal efforts insufficient for increasing innovation. 116
The ideal solution must therefore be based on a better
understanding of the respective interests of both sides at each
phase of product development. However, the traditional approach
usually prefers only one side in allocating intellectual property
rights, namely the employer. 117
Most scholars support this view under an economic
justification. 118 Such scholars start from the premise that
economic efficiency is achieved by granting an incentive that
maximizes benefit, including the profit from a product, which
leads to maximum exploitation. 119 According to this approach,
115

See Robert Gibbons, Incentives in Organizations, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 116
(1998) (describing the incentive structure of the agency model of employment).
116
See id.
117
Orbach, supra note 19, at 2 (“[T]he law that governs the allocation of rights in
creative products produced at the workplace . . . favors employers.”).
118
See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
119
Posner, supra note 19, at 33 (arguing that individual property rights are necessary
for efficient allocation of resources).
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labor, including the development of intellectual goods, is a process
that requires the investment of tremendous resources, such as
work, talent, effort, and capital. No rational actor will make the
necessary investment without the expectation of some kind of
profit, especially during the early uncertain phase before the
developmental process has even begun. 120
Incentivizing
intellectual property production is provided either by conferring
the inventor with future property rights at the exclusion of others
for a limited period of time or by other appropriate
compensation. 121 The current policy is based on the assumption
that a categorical rule that allocates all rights exclusively to the
employer will encourage employers to contribute their part to the
development of intellectual product. 122 Employers accelerate
economic activity in the market by promoting the development of
intellectual products. 123 This important activity is motivated by the
expectation of receiving “extra” rights after the return of costs and
payments that were invested by themselves and others. 124
Moreover, unlike past scenarios, where the heroic individual
inventor was the sole person involved in the development process,
today the inventive process frequently requires greater
involvement by employers. 125 The employer’s role includes, inter
alia, its preliminary initiative in launching the development
process in an area with which it is familiar, its integration among
all relevant players, and the employer’s sources of investment and
assets provided for the purpose of producing the product, including
funding the team of employees that supports development, and the
funding of equipment. 126

120

See id. at 38 (giving numeric examples regarding expected profit).
See id.
122
See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
123
Id.
124
See Posner, supra note 19, at 44 (“[T]he economic benefits of investing in
intellectual property are not exhausted in the initial creation of the property.”).
125
See Fisk, supra note 81, at 179–80 (“Both invention and entrepreneurship became
corporate.”).
126
Merges, supra note 19, at 2–3 (arguing that employers invest in the R&D process as
well as carry the risk of the process).
121
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during the development process, while funding the ongoing work
of employees, funding the means of production and the work
environment; and (iii) after development is completed by
distribution of the product and negotiations for granting a usage
license and enforcement of rights. 127

I posit that the claim that it is efficient to allocate property
rights to employers to motivate them to develop and create future
intellectual goods, which although may seem both reasonable and
logical on its face, is in fact replete with doubts. Conferring all
rights to employers does not necessarily incentivize firms to
engage in additional future activities to develop intellectual
property. Scholars have claimed that alternate incentives and
commercial protection play a greater role than firms’ patent
protection in corporate decisions of whether to create and
develop. 128 Indeed, studies have shown that firms prefer to guard
inventions as a trade secret as opposed to registering them as a
patent. 129 Many firms also use patent protection, not only for the
purpose of developing their inventions, but also to block their
competitors. 130Firms have reported that patent protection was the
last factor in their decision as to whether to invest in research and
development. 131 To the contrary, being the first to break into the
market serves as a major factor in incentivizing development of a
new product. 132 It is therefore
Thequite
employer
possible
is that
thusgranting
regardedproperty
as the
driving economic force (i) in the development process, when
enlisting
employees and building the necessary infrastructure; (ii)
127
See id.; see also Patchett v. Sterling, [1955] R.P.C. 50, 56-57 (H.L.) (holding that
127F

128F

129F

130F

13F

rights to go the employer as a default rule).
See, e.g., Turner, supra note 63, at 187.
129
Submitting a patent application, in contrast to maintaining the idea as a trade secret,
means revealing the idea behind the patent and, if the patent is ultimately confirmed, it
means limiting the duration of the patent protection. Turner, supra note 63, at 188–89.
130
Turner, supra note 63, at 188–89 (asserting that first-to-market, rather than patent
protection, is the main incentive to R&D).
131
See FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 6278–29 (3d ed. 1990) (concluding that expected profits even absent
patent protection are often sufficient for continued product development).
132
Id. (discussing the advantages attaching to being the first to break into the market
and the use of trade secrets as substitute mechanisms for the patent system).
128
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rights to employees in appropriate cases would not significantly
detract from employers’ incentive, which mostly relies on
alternative mechanisms for gaining commercial advantage.
Conferral of rights based on a motivational rationale may actually
play in favor of employees, given thatThe
individuals
question require
that remains
legal
protection
concerns the
and
other
are parameters
influenced of
bythe
it in
developmental
the absence process:
of alternative
Does
133
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where
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public
uncertainty
as a reigns?
whole. It thus emerges that a policy which grants
exclusive rights to employers does so in a manner that does not
necessarily reflect optimal efficiency.
Conceivably, an incentive in the form of absolute property
rights, given ab initio to the employer, is overly broad. Alternative
routes might be taken which could minimize the derogation of
inventor-employees’ rights and hence stimulate overall
productiveness. For example, were the rights to be conferred to
the employee, the employer would be able to purchase the rights
therein from the employee at a later stage after the development of
the product has been completed and when the product is shown to
be “promising” in quantifiable terms.
Another possible
arrangement would be to grant usage licenses to the employer. 134
Furthermore, in my view, the employee involved in a “start-up”
era, as described in Part II, would be more strongly motivated than
the former employer and would have the monetary ability to
develop the intellectual product and to protect its rights, as it is his
or her main asset.
In summary, I claim that the current property regime is not the
only possible regime and might not even be the most efficient one.
Indeed, alternative possibilities have not been given serious

133

See Turner, supra note 63, at 187 (regarding small, independent inventors, who are
not in the position to take advantage of alternative incentives).
134
But see Hovell, supra note 7 (claiming that the contractual solution bears transaction
costs and may lead to inefficient allocation of rights and the concealment of information
by employers). See generally LYNNE MILLWARD, UNDERSTANDING OCCUPATIONAL &
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 188–243 (2005) (offering a more complex view of
motivation of employees from psychological personality perspective).
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consideration. 135 The “rights” regime should be reconsidered with
a view to broadening the category of potential beneficiaries of
intellectual property rights. 136 Perhaps the law and economics
theory ignores the nature and burden of the creative process from
the inventor’s perspective. 137 After all, the individual motivation
problem is one of the principal concerns in current discourse
concerning the appropriate allocation of intellectual property in
general, and specifically in IP products developed within the
workplace. 138 The progress of technology is dependent upon
contributions made by individuals in solving problems. 139 It is
therefore important to encourage individuals to create and commit
134F

135F

136F

137F

138F

135

See SCHERER, supra note 131, at 444–46 (discussing the advantages attached to
being the first to break into the market and the use of trade secrets as a substitute
mechanism for the patent system).
136
See, e.g., Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization,
206 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that in the absence of a contractual
agreement, there is an assumption that the title to the copyright belongs to the person who
initiated and funded the work rather than automatically belonging to the employer).
137
See Cherensky, supra note 64 (focusing on the implications of Professor Margaret
Radin’s theory about property and personhood for service invention laws and how private
contractual agreements have mooted the attempt at balancing the interests of both the
employer and employee); Yuval Feldman, An Experimental Approach to the Study of
Social Norms: The Allocation of Intellectual Property Rights in the Workplace, 10 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 59, 69 (2002) (discussing psychological perspectives of employee’s
invention while asserting that most law and economics scholars believe that proprietary
rights should go to the employer; also rejects the rationality assumption of efficiency as
the dominant factor underlying economic theory).
138
See Posner, supra note 19, at 37–40 (discussing how the patent system is limited by
five sub-mechanisms in order to reduce costs, thereby enhancing motivation to develop
patents: (1) expirations for patents (2) strict criteria for registration of patents (an obvious
invention cannot be patentable, despite the investment in its development), (3) granting
patents before the product is ready to go into the trade market to avoid duplicates, (4)
criteria that the invention is useful, and (5) fundamental concepts, such as laws of
physics, are not patentable). On the incentive of firms in general, see Gibbons, supra
note 87; Canice Prendergast, The Provision of Incentives in Firms, 37 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 7 (1999). With regard to discourse in relation to employee’s invention, see
Dratler, supra note 23 for the importance of motivation to research and developments
employees. See also Neal Orkin, Rewarding Employee Invention: Time for a Change, 62
HARV. BUS. REV. 56 (1984).
139
See Dratler, supra note 23 (discussing the importance of the motivation factor in
patents development); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1098
(1972) (“There are also preferences which are linked to dynamic efficiency concepts –
producers ought to be rewarded since they will cause everyone to be better off in the
end.”).
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themselves to new ideas, for otherwise technology and progress
will not develop at the accelerated rate that is imperative during
times of crises.
Joseph Stiglitz claimed that the slowdown at the end of the
twentieth century has its source in the absence of technological
changes which, itself, was the result of the absence of
incentives. 140 The solution, in his view, is to be found in one of
two paths: Government support for research and development, by
virtue of investments or tax breaks, or rewarding those responsible
for creation and development in order to promote productive
activity—i.e., by allocating additional rights to employees apart
from their salary. 141
Mary La France has also pointed out other problematic aspects
of allocating all rights to employers. For example, she has claimed
that a law passed in the state of Nevada, ostensibly to broaden
employees’ rights, instead broadened rights of employers. 142 The
law automatically granted the employer intellectual property rights
in any employee invention conceived in the course of work unless
agreed otherwise. 143 La France has shown that this law
discouraged worker immigration to Nevada and caused them to
prefer other states such as California or Washington where the
legal position was more favorable in terms of employees’ rights (at
least, that employers who wished to gain IP rights in employee
work product had to explicitly contract for it). 144 This result was
quite the opposite of the intended goal, which was to stimulate
technological growth in Nevada. 145 On the contrary, studies have
shown that states with high technology growth, like California and
Washington, are specifically ones that have passed laws
139F

140F

14F

142F

143F

14F

140

See STIGLITZ, supra note 52.
Id.
142
Mary LaFrance, Nevada’s Employee Inventions Statute: Novel, Nonobvious and
Patently Wrong, 3 NEV. L.J. 88, 88–90 (2002).
143
See id. at 88, 107–14 (asserting that the law in Nevada which broadens employer
property rights in any employee invention might encourage workers to prefer other
states).
144
Id.
145
Id. at 108.
141
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broadening employees’ rights and restricting employers’ ability to
contract around this. 146
When employees are not rewarded, employee-inventors may
opt for one of the following options: (i) avoidance of development
of IP products; (ii) development of products that comply with the
minimum standards for satisfactory discharging of employees’
duties; (iii) smuggling of significant IP outside of the organization;
or (iv) as suggested in this sub-section, preference of a workplace
in a different location that ensures, by legislation, better benefits to
employed inventors.
B. The Many Stages of Incentivized and Creative Employees
Understanding the varying levels of motivation furthers
awareness of the need to increase employees’ motivations,
especially under conditions of uncertainty.
Motivation in the
context of intellectual property can be divided into various stages:
(1) The incentive to invent and create. The assumption is
that the rules of intellectual property should supply the incentive
required to promote inventions and the creative process in
general. 147 The investment required for especially creative
products that demand exceptional intellectual resources of the
inventors compel a commensurate incentive for the employee. In
the absence of a special incentive, no ground-breaking and unique
inventions can be expected for the benefit of all. This claim gains
even more force where it relates to the pre-invention stage.
(2) Incentive to innovate. This incentive should not only
motivate employee-inventors to invent, but also to break new
ground inventing significant welfare-promoting and successful
inventions. Establishing the exclusivity of incentives for creative
employees will motivate them to innovate in a manner that leads to
meaningful added value for society, and for which society should

146

Id.
See Mark A. Lemley, Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997) (“[B]oth the United States Constitution and judicial
decisions seem to acknowledge the primacy of incentive theory in justifying intellectual
property.”).
147
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pay a price. 148 Any invention should be new and innovative, but it
is clear that there should also be a direct relationship between our
desire for creativity and our willingness to provide greater
incentives for the same.
(3) Incentive to disclose. Any intellectual product has its
source in the inner recesses of a person’s mind, which must make
its way to the external world in order to garner protection and bear
fruit. Indeed, disclosure serves a number of roles: it enables the
transition from the stage of an idea, which is not protected by the
laws of intellectual protection, to that of a protectable product.
Thus, disclosure is an essential element of the law of intellectual
property because it forms the basis of the “transaction” between
the creator and the public, whereby the public grants creators an
exclusive right for a limited period of time in exchange for such
disclosure. Specifically, encouraging disclosure is of particular
importance in the context of employees. 149 Without appropriate
incentives, employees will prefer not to disclose their thoughts to
the employer, since all rights may ultimately be transferred to the
employer. The commercial potential of the invention may serve as
an incentive for hiding it from the employer until the stage at
which the employee can develop it independently. From a public
perspective, this kind of thinking is problematic because it prevents
the efficient connection between the employer’s capital and
commercial power, and the creative potential of the employee.
(4) Incentive to commercialize and distribute the product.
Motivation should also be related to the commercialization of the
product, its distribution, and the deriving of profits therefrom. The
employee plays a crucial role at the development and creation
stage. The talent, genius, and reflection of personality, to the
extent that they are expressed in the intellectual product, mainly
stem from the employee-inventor.
The importance of the
employee does not, however, end at the development stage, but
148
Bartow, supra note 23, at 3 n.12 (“[I]ndividuals work hardest when they stand to
personally gain from their efforts. The same principle applies to motivating creative
people.” (quoting Ron Riley, Inventors Deserve Their Fair Share, Machine Design, Mar.
21, 1994 at 109)).
149
See FISK, supra note 81, at 180–81 (discussing how firms developed legal tools to
control employees’ creativity).
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rather continues after the product has appeared in the real world.
150
Even at this stage, it is important to encourage the inventor to
cooperate with the employer and with third parties who are seeking
to purchase rights in the product. The latter parties require the
employee’s help in registering a patent, adjusting a product for a
particular client, introducing required changes in the product,
explaining the product, and marketing the product. It is frequently
necessary to also have the employee’s cooperation with future
projects, and it is therefore important to encourage the employee to
“stay in the picture” even after termination of the instant project.
149F

V. WHY THE (“FREE”) MARKET IS INSUFFICIENT
A. Differences in Bargaining Power Between the Parties
The basic assumption in the economic analysis of employeeemployer relations is that the employee is the weaker party due to
differences in negotiating power, accessibility to relevant
information (both legal and economic), respective levels of control
of financial resources, and accessibility to the legal system in order
to enforce one’s rights. 151 These power differences become even
more pronounced at the pre-invention stage, during which
employees are usually required to waive their rights in exchange
for a steady income and the promise of job security. I claim that a
150F

150

Dratler, supra note 23, at 137, 168–73 (describing the phases of the development
process of intellectual property products, which involve many factors).
151
See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41
MD L. REV. 563, 563, 614–24 (1982) (“[D]istributive and paternalist motives . . . explain
far better than any notion of rectifying unequal bargaining power the widespread legal
institution of compulsory contract terms in areas such as the allocation of risk.”); Parker,
supra note 4, at 625 (arguing that because research and development employees have
disadvantageous bargaining power, their rights in service products must be protected
when rights were produced outside the scope of the employment relationship); see also
Orbach, supra note 19, at 44 (With a lack of accessibility to legal enforcement, hiring
parties wish to avoid litigation because “they often enjoy advantageous bargaining power
that allows them to acquire more extensive rights than provided for by the default
rules.”). See generally Richard E. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18
J. L. & ECON. 293 (1975) (explaining unequal bargaining power); Eyal Zamir, The
Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 229–86 (1998) (regarding the positive
effect of paternalism).

182

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:140

change in approach is needed. Legislators should adopt a more
paternalistic position and enact jus cogens legislation, which will
apply even if parties contract for the opposite. 152
15F

Professor Catherine Fisk claimed that employees in research
and development positions are not weak employees. 153 She argues,
instead, that these are usually senior employees who are highly
educated and receive high salaries, with high job mobility and who
to a certain extent “determine” their own work conditions. 154 It
would appear, however, that despite these characteristics,
employees in research and development are subject to a power
imbalance.
The work conditions of developers demand
particularly hard work and long hours that exceed the boundaries
of existing protective legislation. 155 For the most part they are not
organized, and, apart from a few “star” developers, do not enjoy
preferential work conditions. Further, the market is, for the most
part, monopsonic. 156 Despite the fact that certain employees may
have greater work mobility, they nonetheless have no ability to
choose between those workplaces that offer extra rights and those
that do not. Almost all firms require employees to waive their
rights to intellectual products, and so in that sense, employees are
limited in their ability to choose. “Free competition” is therefore
an illusion. 157
152F

153F

154F

15F

156F

152
See Wolk, supra note 45, at 273 (positing that although there is no harmonization of
laws across Europe in the matter of employed inventor remuneration, employees are
normally awarded through mandatory provisions in national legislation). See generally
Kennedy, supra note 120, at 590–91 (arguing that fundamental norms of international
laws usually refer to groups such as consumers, employees, tenants).
153
See FISK, supra note 81, at 178–88.
154
See id. at 178–80 (stating that employees most likely to invent in the twentieth
century were professionally trained, skilled engineers).
155
Bartow, supra note 23, at 682–84.
156
See Posner, supra note 19, at 425–26 (explaining that employers gain monopolies on
power when employees are not aware of occupational alternatives, or when the costs of
moving from one role to the other are high, or when employers coordinate their efforts by
mutual restricting employees’ rights.); see also Bartow, supra note 23, at 683.
157
See FISK, supra note 81, at 171, 181, 187 (asserting that ownership of inventions has
become solely a matter of contract); see also Corey Field, Their Master’s Voice, 48 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 145, 153 (2000) (explaining that the employer or several other
categories of those who commissioned the work are considered to be the authors under
work made for hire doctrine, in contrast to the employee who is the natural author).
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B. Cognitive Bias and Its Significance
Recent psychology and legal scholarship has also put forth
additional, compelling reasons why the free market does not
succeed in regulating the division of IP rights in a manner that
would obviate the need for binding legislative intervention.
Specifically, it points to non-rational aspects of human conduct and
their effect on the law. Endorsers of these theories challenge the
assumption that people act as rational logical beings who
invariably seek to maximize utility; rather, they argue that the
decision-making process is slanted by psychological and social
biases. 158 Richard Epstein argued that recognition must be had for
two central truths pertaining to the limitations of human nature in
the realm of decision-making. The first is the cognitive problem—
many people make cardinal mistakes in their decisions concerning
important matters. The second is the emotional problem—people
do not control their feelings and, as a result, decision-making is
impaired. 159 Further, inter-personal relationships provoke intense
feelings that significantly influence the nature of individual
interactions, often impairing rationality. Indeed, overall it has been
shown that individuals have difficulty making well-informed
decisions about the future. 160
157F

158F

159F

158

See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, PAUL SLOVIC & AMOS TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982) (showing that the effect of cognitive
biases becomes stronger under uncertainty conditions); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, How
Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights and Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
6, 7–11, 15–19, 30–35 (2002) (explaining the issues that exist in the gap between
employees’ beliefs about their rights and reality in an employee-at-will context);
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473–87 (1998) (asserting that increased attention to
actual human behavior can improve law and economics analysis); Daphna Lewinsohn–
Zamir, The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited: Critical
Observation from Behavioral Studies, 80 TEX. L. REV. 219, 222 (2001) (arguing that
owners exhibit a stronger endowment effect which suppresses efficient bargaining as well
as demonstrating systematic under-compensating offers).
159
See Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market
Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 112–15 (2006) (addressing two facts about human
nature: the fact that people often make serious mistakes in deciding important matters,
and the fact that people often find it hardest to keep their emotions in check when it
matters the most).
160
See id. at 112–13 (explaining that because people make errors about reality as well
as about their preferences, most people will never be able to optimize anything);
Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 158, at 267–71 (arguing that cognitive biases, such as
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Over the last decade cognitive limits have merited renewed
attention. 161 The importance of psychological bias, I argue, is even
more acute in the employer-employee context, in which we cannot
expect either party to operate in a rational manner, either with
regard to the present contract or rights in future products. The
employer is in no hurry to waive its rights, even if it might be more
efficient in the long run. Conversely, the employee can expect to
receive lower compensation in return for his or her waiver.
One might question why the employer is unprepared to waive
its rights in any employee work product as a means of
incentivizing its employees to produce and invent if it results in a
business advantage in the market. One explanation might be the
“endowment effect.” 162 People posit a greater value for something
that they own. This means that a person will demand a greater
price for the waiver of an asset in his/her possession when
compared to the price he/she would have been prepared to pay for
the same item in possession of another. The employer who holds
the IP rights in the first place may feel that the product is already
part of its property and will, therefore, be reluctant to waive any
rights therein. Alternatively, the price it may demand for such
160F

16F

availability and the tendency to remember outstanding events; selective perception;
computation limitations; data presentations and over-optimism regarding low probability
risks are likely to impair the decision-making process even when thinking about a
decision as simple as buying a TV set).
161
The discourse on “cognitive bias” was first introduced by two distinguished scholars
from the psychology field: Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who established a
cognitive basis theory for common human errors using heuristics and biases. See Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness,
3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 430 (defining cognitive bias as a pattern of perceptual
distortion, inaccurate judgment, and illogical interpretation, which may lead to impaired
judgment); see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decisions Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (developing of the prospect
theory as a more realistic alternative to rational choice theory). But see, Norbert L. Kerr,
Robert J. MacCoun, & Godfrey P. Kramer, Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals
and Groups, 103 (4) PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 687 (1996) (discussing that the magnitude of
individual and group bias depends on several factors, and arguing that there is no simple
answer to this issue).
162
See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 193–206
(1991) (noting that people often demand much more to give up a particular object than
they would be willing to pay to acquire it).
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rights will be higher than the price the employee is prepared to or
able to pay. 163
Another explanation is the influence of the “status quo bias.” 164
This bias gives rise to an unwillingness to deviate from an existing
(legal) rule. Employers are not enthusiastic about “innovation” if it
means changing the prevailing norm, even if such change may
actually increase profits in the long run. The employee, on the
other hand, will tend to be “over optimistic” about the future. 165
The employee is prepared to accept a job and a salary in the
present without rationally considering the costs of a waiver of
future profit. This phenomenon may also be explained by the
162F

163F

164F

163

The endowment effect might explain the behavior of many institutions that refrain
from giving rights to workers, despite knowledge by the employers that rights in the
product, and royalties from their sales, will ultimately increase the motivation of the
workers to create. These institutions may still refuse employee rights despite
publications according to which granting appropriate consideration to the employeeinventor raised the income of the universities and hospitals that granted these rights. See
Lewinsohn–Zamir, supra note 158, at 222 (asserting that a strong endowment effect was
exhibited by owners and led to inefficient bargaining).
164
See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 612 (1998) (explaining that “[c]ontracting parties view default
terms as part of the status quo and they prefer the status quo to alternative states”);
William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (stating that when we make a decision, we have a choice
of doing nothing or maintaining someone’s current or previous decision (the status quo
alternative) and that decision-making experiments reveal that individuals
disproportionally stick to the status quo alternative).
165
See generally Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above
Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993) (focusing on example of optimistic evaluations of young
couples regarding the prospects of a successful marriage despite the well known, high
rate of divorce); Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low
Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565, 566, 569–
571 (1989) (noting that people do not view risk in a rational way, even when the facts are
well known; for example, they assume lower risk for car accidents even when being
aware of real data to the contrary); Christine Jolls, Privacy and Consent Over Time: The
Role of Agreement in Fourth Amendment Analysis, WM. & MARY L . REV 1693, 1704–05
(2013) (arguing that employees agree to possible future intrusions on privacy because of
cognitive bias such as over-optimism); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About
Future Life Events, 39 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY. 5, 806 (1980) (showing generally that
people are optimistic regarding their risks); Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein,
Unrealistic Optimism: Present and Future, 15 J. OF SOCIAL AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 1
(1996) (explaining that people assert they are less likely than others to experience
negative events).
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“discounting” effect. 166 The employee does not take future profits
into account, being more impressed by profits in the present (in the
form of a high salary). 167 However, the conclusion leads the
employee to mistakenly assume that, in the event of future profits,
even if he or she does not expect personal profit in the present, he
or she will nonetheless receive a certain portion of them.
In sum, because individuals are likely to focus on short-term
maximization, and not long-term efficiency, a legislative solution
may be needed as a paternalistic means of inducing innovative
change in the long run.
C. The Ineffectiveness of Labor Unions
At this point, one might object and point to the existence of
labor unions or collective organizations as an important available
tool for narrowing unequal bargaining power and improved access
to legal and economic information. 168 Indeed, the collective power
of organized inventors within the framework of freedom of
association and the right to collective bargaining, along with jus
cogens legislation, may have tremendous potential for striking a
balance between the power of employees and that of employers
and, thus, to generate a fairer and more appropriate arrangement. 169
However, such unions or associations of employee-inventors are
not common in the U.S. 170 This may be attributable to the fact that
once employee-inventors assign all the intellectual property rights
to the employer by valid contracts, the organizations are deprived
of their main source of bargaining power and, hence, are powerless
to influence commercial relationships, which might otherwise have
been formulated with greater emphasis on more equal distribution

166

See Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and
Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1297 (1991) (concluding that many people,
left to their own devices, will not save enough for their old age).
167
See id. at 1285–86 (1991).
168
See STIGLITZ, supra note 52, at 86–88.
169
See Peberdy and Strowel, supra note 14, at 66 (using the example of France where
collective agreements governing all employees working in a particular industrial sector
serve as a basis for calculating and deciding upon employees remuneration).
170
See Bartow, supra note 23, at 677 (arguing that inventors should organize and act
collectively).
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of rights and benefits. 171 These organizations may also have to
confront stringent competition laws. 172 Perhaps for these reasons,
organizations of employees who are creators or inventors are
barely recognized in American law. Labor unions are usually
involved in negotiations of work conditions and threshold social
rights, and they are less involved in this particular realm. 173
Moreover, the power of labor unions, in general, is gradually
diminishing. 174 And lastly, labor unions have been harshly
criticized as a restrictive trade practice. 175 Thus, labor unions on
their own cannot solve the power imbalance problem, nor can we
expect their very existence to reflect efficient agreements made in
a truly free market.
170F

17F

172F

173F

174F

VI. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
A. Limiting Transferability of Employee IP Rights
My proposed model flips the existing norm in which employers
are presumed to hold IP rights over employee work product.
Rather, I propose that legislation mandate that employees hold IP
rights in their work product, and that a transfer of these rights
would only occur in certain cases, namely when the transfer would
encourage productivity. It is not disputed that one of the important
aspects of IP, much like real property, is its transferability, 176 and
on one hand, transferability in this context reflects the autonomy
175F

171

See Bartow, supra note 23, at 715. This article proposes a unique solution for the
disincentive problem: rather than waiting for congressional or judicial action, inventors
should organize and act collectively by refusing to sign any pre-invention assignment
agreements in the future, by “revoking” pre-invention assignment agreements currently in
effect, and by retaining ownership of their patented inventions.
172
Shlomit Yanisky Ravid, Freedom Of Association Versus Competition Laws Comparative Study) (unpublished manuscript).
173
See Bartow, supra note 23, at 715.
174
US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AMERICAN LABOR HISTORY, available at
http://economics.about.com/od/laborinamerica/a/labor_history.htm (last visited Dec. 11,
2012).
175
See Ravid, supra note 172 (noting that legal decisions preferred competition laws
over freedom of association in most of the countries that participated in the comparative
study).
176
See JOSEPH T. MAHONEY, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGY 109 (4th ed.
2004).
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and the freedom of employees to transfer, sell, or negotiate these
rights. On the other hand, however, as we have already
established, employers are prone to “abuse” their negotiating
power and demand that employees transfer all of their property
rights up front. 177 It is therefore suggested that employee transfers
of IP rights be legislatively limited, and to determine a list of
circumstances in which the law will neither permit nor recognize
contracting out of employees’ rights when such a contract is to the
detriment of the employee. At the same time, an appropriate
judicial forum should be established to rule on the question of
whether a transfer in a particular case and under certain
circumstances is detrimental to the employee and, hence, invalid.
Other explicit contracts transferring employee IP rights that satisfy
the conditions of fair transactional conditions will receive legal
validity.
The interesting question is whether there should be a statutory
enumeration of cases in which the transfer of rights is
automatically deemed valid or whether there is a need for an
explicit individual contract for each and any occasion in which the
employee transfers his or her rights. I will examine the advantages
and disadvantages of each option below.
The advantage of a statutory “automatic” transfer of rights to
the employer lies in reduced transaction costs. The law determines
what the parties would have been likely to agree upon in the
absence of a legal, statutory rule. This kind of law would therefore
save the costs of negotiating and drafting a separate agreement for
each specific case. 178 On the other hand, numerous advantages
attach to the contractual transfer of rights from the employee to the
employer.
In what follows, I will set forth some of the advantages of
requiring an explicit contractual transfer as opposed to the
automatic transfer of rights to the employer.

177

See supra Part V.A.
See Christopher A. Riley, Designing Default Rules in Contract Law: Consent,
Conventionalism, and Efficiency, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 367–90 (2000)
(examining three accepted explanations for the default option—subjective agreement, the
accepted norm and economic efficiency).
178

2013]

RETHINK INNOVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY

189

(1) The slippery slope. The upfront statutory transfer may
obliterate the concept of employees’ rights in IP work products, or
at least divest it of any content. A statutory determination that
automatically awards IP rights to employers paves the way for
broadening employers’ rights in a broad spectrum of cases. This
statutory presumption in favor of the employer may create a
slippery slope in the wake of excessively broad interpretations of
cases in which IP rights are deemed de facto invested in
employers. 179 Transfer of IP rights to the employer is undesirable
when the connection between the service and the product is
tenuous, such as when the product relates to an area in which the
employer itself is involved, even if the employee is not ETI and the
employer did not invest resources in the development of the
product.
(2) Normative value. From a normative perspective, when
there is an up-front transfer to the employer, the employer is
perceived as the first and rightful owner of the right. The latter
conception is the precise opposite of the model proposed in this
Article, according to which the creator or the inventor is presumed
the de facto owner of the rights. The contractual approach is thus
more consistent with this normative presumption.
(3) Employee awareness. When the law confers the rights to
the employers up-front, employees are not necessarily aware of
their waiver of rights and transfer to the employer because the
arrangement will apply even when the specific employment
contract is silent on the matter, i.e., in cases of ETI. The statutory
conferral of rights to the employer obviates the need to specify the
transfer in the employment contract. According to the model
proposed in this Article, employee awareness of rights is important
per se. A fair negotiation of a rights transfer to the employer can
only take place, if at all, if the transfer is explicitly referred to in
the employment contract, providing certainty that the employee is
aware of this waiver after the invention has reached a concrete
form, and the contract further provides for compensation. A
statutory transfer, after the invention is developed, circumvents the
possibility of negotiation. An automatic transfer thus precludes the
179

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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possibility of the better-informed party, in this case the employer,
disclosing valuable information to the less-informed party, in this
case the employee.
(4) Burden of proof. When an employee transfers to the
employer a right that originally belonged to the employee, it is
likely that the transferee (the employer) bears the onus of proving
the fulfillment of the conditions required to validate the transfer.
When the law determines that, under certain conditions, the right
vests with the employer, then the employee would bear the burden
of proof—and, as the employee has less resources at his or her
disposal and, very likely, less information, he or she may not be
able to meet that burden as well as the employer might be able to.
(5) Tax benefits. The transfer of property to the employee and
its subsequent transfer to the employer are also important for tax
reasons. If the property belongs to the employee and the employee
transfers it to the employer, subject to certain conditions, then the
asset is a capital asset, and subject to a lower taxation rate. 180
When property is originally vested in the employer, the payment of
consideration to the employee may be viewed as a payment of
revenue, in which case higher tax rates would apply. 181
(6) Power discrepancies. A rule that allocates to the employer
all rights in advance reflects the power discrepancies between the
parties discussed above. 182 It establishes the advance “surrender”
of the weaker party in the form of a waiver of rights.
(7) Low transaction costs.
The employee-employer
relationship is a close one that can be regulated by employment
180

See Justine P. Morreale, Patents, Know-How and Trademarks: A Tax Overview, 29
TAX L. 553, 554 (1975-1976).
181
See ISABEL VERLINDEN, AXEL SMITS & BART LIEBEN (LANDWELL), INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS FROM A TRANSFER PRICING PERSPECTIVE 50, 72 (2002) (stating that the
legal owner is an important concept in the United States; generally concurs with the view
that the legal owner of the intangible asset is also the party entitled to the income; the tax
consequences of an assignment will, for the most part, be determined by what has
happened in the development phase, and whether one group company has itself done the
development, or if the work has been done under a R&D contract, or if the work has been
done under a cost-sharing arrangement); Morreale, supra note 180, at 554–57 (noting that
a license from the developer might be considered as a sale for tax purposes and
independent inventor enjoys benefits when licensing the invention).
182
See discussion supra Part II.
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agreements and, as such, the transaction costs are likely to be
low. 183
(8) Information-forcing mechanism. As has already been
briefly discussed above, a contractual transfer may, in certain
circumstances, encourage the employer to disclose critical
information. An employer not satisfied by the statutory default
model (assuming that the law confers IP rights to employees) will
seek to establish an explicit opposite rule in the contract ensuring
that valuable information is transferred to the other party. The
very act of determining a condition which is the opposite of the
default option directs the employee’s attention to the explicit
arrangement in the contract and motivates the employer to transfer
the information in its possession to the employee—what Ian Ayres
and Robert Gertner call “penalty defaults” or an informationforcing rule. 184
(9) Just deserts. When the employers “merit” receiving all of
the rights, they receive extra privileges that they would almost
certainly not have received in an automatic transfer where the
employer is presumed deserving of such rights.
(10) Consideration required. Such a transfer to the employer
would more likely require consideration to be paid to the
employee, whereas in an automatic transfer the employee would
likely receive nothing in addition to ordinary salary. The policy
proposed in this Article stresses a de facto allocation of rights
183

See Björn Bartling, Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Transaction Costs, Power
Abuse, and the Employment Relation: Economic Origins of Authority 2 (Sept. 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://whu.edu/static/geaba/Symposium/2011/
Papiere/E1-Bartling.pdf (“[T]he employment contract is more flexible because the
employer can quickly adjust the service to be provided . . . . On the other hand . . . the
employment contract can force the employee to choose an inefficient action that is most
profitable for the employer but very costly for the employee.”).
184
See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989-1990) (suggesting penalty
defaults rules within a contract be purposefully designed to encourage the parties to
reveal information to each other or to third parties and that the law should be designed
efficiently to encourage the side who holds the information to share it with the other
side); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1991-1992) (stating that contingently
incomplete contracts give certain private parties incentives to either renegotiate or breach
the original contract to realize these additional gains from trade).
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and/or benefits to the employee and for the transfer of rights from
employed inventors to the employer only in particular
circumstances, that is, at the advanced stages of product
development. According to my proposal, employed inventors
would be entitled to receive extra-salary compensation for
transferring their rights to their employers. The compensation
would be anchored in a jus cogens rule. Complementary
mechanisms would be established to void a transfer in the event of
non-payment of consideration and provide a mechanism for
resolving disputes concerning what, or how much, constitutes
adequate consideration.
Moreover, the inefficiency deriving from the absence of
international regulation and coordination of employee-inventor
rights stresses the need to establish an international tool, under the
auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
that would address and regulate the allocation of rights within the
workplace.
B. Special Consideration
The subject of consideration is not mentioned as an alternative
to my proposal in this Article, but rather stresses the need for
adequate consideration in any transfer of rights from the employee
to the employer. Unlike in the U.S., a number of substantial
compensation awards have been made recently in Europe. 185 For
example, the Patents Court in the United Kingdom (U.K.) awarded
considerable compensation in the case of Kelly v. GE Healthcare
in 2009. 186 Two inventors were awarded £1.5 million (about $2.2
million). 187 Moreover, a former employee of the French National
184F

185F

186F

185

See Peberdy & Strowel, supra note 14, at 63, 65 (“The source of employee inventor
compensation laws differs from country to country. Many European countries (including
the UK, The Netherlands, France, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Spain and Hungary) include
employee inventor compensation provisions in their national patent legislation. Others,
such as Germany, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Poland, have enacted specific
employee compensation laws.
Belgium does not provide a statutory right to
compensation, although a right has developed through case law . . . .”).
186
See Kelly v. GE Healthcare, [2009] EWHC (Pat) 181, [207] (Eng.).
187
See id. But see Pebery & Strowel, supra note 14, at 63, 65 (suggesting that this case
may not be as significant as many have predicted as the invention—the Myoview—was
easily recognized as belonging to Amersham (the employer) and, given that it was a bestselling product, its benefit to the employer in term of income was easily measured).
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Railways was awarded more than $750,000 from a court in Paris
for inventing a system that allowed the railway to save around $22
million annually. 188 The justifications for doing so have been
explained in this Article. 189 The principal reason for this is that
consideration is necessary to create incentive as well as
compensatory mechanisms that establish the link between
compensation and commercial success of the product. Inventors’
desire for cooperation in the process of transferring intellectual
property includes the desire to ensure their own financing and to
profit in excess of their existing salary. 190
For example, the scholar Jay Dratler has argued that, under a
pro-employer regime, employees lack motivation which might lead
to the diminishment of intellectual products. 191 Incentive bonuses,
currently in place in certain firms, are not enough. 192
An
employee whose invention is approved by a company committee
will receive a fixed-sum bonus, which is far lower than his or her
salary. Exceptional or tremendous displays of incentive, initiative,
and investment should not be expected in that situation.
Conceivably, in the Anglo-American allocation regime, which
allocates property rights to the employer by way of law or contract,
granting adequate financial incentives to employed inventors,
when economic efficiency justifies transferring property rights to
the employer, creates an appropriate balance between the
conflicting interests of the employee, employer, and public. A rule
that institutionalizes the duty of paying consideration to employees
in any transfer of rights to employers somewhat blunts the
criticism of such one-sided transfers. In order to overcome the
motivation problem, firms have developed complex incentivizing
mechanisms. 193 However, these voluntary plans, initiated at the
187F

18F

189F

190F

19F

192F

188

See Pebery & Strowel, supra note 14, at 63.
See discussion supra Part IV.
190
See Merges, supra note 19, at 3, 38–52, 53–54 (justifying payment of consideration
to employee-inventors from a law and economics perspective).
191
See Dratler, supra note 23, at 185–86 (suggesting that the allocation of patent rights
provided by the present legal structure entirely misses the goal of promoting innovation
within firms).
192
See discussion supra Part IV.
193
See Merges, supra note 19, at 39, 40 (dividing incentive into four groups: (1)
promotion of the creative employee; (2) granting a bonus to an employee for a particular
189
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discretion of the firms, are not sufficient. Such compensation
schemes should be mandated by statute to ensure optimal
efficiency.
The issue of employee compensation is important, not only to
inventors, but also to the industry and innovation level in the U.S.
However, it is worth noting that there are significant differences,
even among jurisdictions adopting a legally-binding compensation
regime. At one end, in the U.K., claims are rarely granted, but are
likely to be significant. 194 At the other, in France, compensation is
routine, but typically at a much lower level. 195 Countries like
France, which usually assess compensation at the time when the
invention was made, typically award lower amounts of
compensation than those countries, such as the U.K., which
calculate compensation after the invention has been exploited. 196
Consideration is a more effective tool than other incentives like
granting a limited monopoly over patents, in that consideration
increases the amount of intellectual products and their quality
without payment of the social price caused by broadening
monopolies. 197 Consideration is also preferred over direct
government investment in these fields because the latter requires
193F

194F

195F

196F

invention; (3) a product that provides the basis for a bonus to the employee; and (4)
administrative evaluation of the invention along with the employee’s evaluation).
194
See Peberdy & Strowel, supra note 14, at 63–66.
195
See id. at 66–67.
196
Id. (suggesting that the later the compensation is paid, the larger the amount that is
paid); Wolk, supra note 45, at 296 (“There are two different legislative approaches in
Europe, as well as a disparity between, on one hand, UK law, and on the other hand,
French, German, Spanish and Swedish law. In the United Kingdom, the threshold is very
high because of the ‘outstanding benefit’ requirement, and employee inventors are rarely
awarded additional compensation.”).
197
Consideration is preferable to the extension of the exclusivity period for rights
holders and the fortification of monopolistic rights given today. See STIGLITZ, supra note
52, at 346–47 (Monopolistic rights in intellectual products create a low level of creation
and a higher price of the product during the protection period. Regarding this point, there
is constant tension between dynamic efficiency by way of motivation for investment and
static efficiency which means that companies will continue to produce until the point at
which the price is equal to the marginal profit. To the extent that the protection period is
shorter, so too the party who is not the owner of the rights in the product will be able to
benefit from future developments. The shortening of the protection period reduces the
cost of a creation that relies on another creation.); POSNER, supra note 19, at 41 (noting
that the contribution of future payment of royalties towards the creator’s motivation in
creating becomes negligible).
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large sums of public tax money. 198 If consideration increases the
overall public “cake,” it does so because it occurs without any
extra “payment” or investment from the public.
197F

In sum, I propose an explicit statutory arrangement for the
payment of consideration to inventors and creators apart from their
salary. Such payment should take place only after the product is in
its advanced stages of development, when both parties have clear
data at their disposal as to fair value.
The relevant statute should establish jus cogens arrangements,
which accommodate the possibility of adjusting the contractual
consideration in the event of a change in circumstances, for
example, if the product proves to be wildly successful. Such
decisions would be made by an administrative body who would
take into account factors such as product royalties in making its
final decision of what constitutes adequate consideration.
C. A “Red Carpet” for Entrepreneurs
In addition, different rules should apply to those who are risk
averse and those who are not. Where employees are not risk
averse, it is not appropriate to apply the paradigm of “risk
exchange” in exchange for a waiver of property rights in the
product. An employee who is willing to take risks or is risk neutral
might very well become an entrepreneur. Employees in this
category should be encouraged to develop intellectual products,
and thus even be induced by an allocation of rights in their favor.
Failure to secure such an employee’s rights in the product may
cause the employee to forget about significant innovation or
“smuggle” the intellectual product outside the firm in order to
begin his or her own development of the product, even if it
involves certain risk. Thus, a proper policy would allow such
employees a “red carpet” to safely develop their products. 199
198F

198

See STIGLITZ, supra note 52, at 348; Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of
Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326 (2006) (supporting using
private laws with tax system in order to promote distribution justice).
199
The employer might get compensation according to the amount which the employer
has invested in the invention.
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D. Attributing Inventors
An inventor’s entitlement to attribution rights in the inventions
he or she has developed might also play a major factor in
enhancing innovative activity in the workplace. Publishing the
name of the inventor is very important, not only from a personality
perspective, but also for economic reasons. 200 Traditionally, the
rule was that patents were declared invalid if the wrong inventors
were named on the patent. This gave parties prosecuting a patent
application an incentive to name every inventor. 201 Unfortunately,
the America Invents Act 202 changed the tradition of the patent
filing system, which previously published the name of the inventor
himself in the public record and contained his or her name in the
patent application. 203 The new law makes it much easier for
employers to avoid attribution of inventions and patents to
employees and to unilaterally file patent applications on their
behalf. Under this new regime, employee contribution suffers
from a lack of visibility and lack of quantification. Therefore, we
should return to the traditional model where patents are attributed
to the employees who have developed them. 204
CONCLUSION
Advancement of an appropriate policy for IP work products
has become critical in an era where there is much interest in raising
the level of innovation nationally. Insofar as most inventions are
invented in corporate frameworks, we must begin to analyze what
drives employee inventive spirit in the workplace. This Article
200

See Xiyin Tang, The Artist as Brand: Toward a Trademark Conception of Moral
Rights, 122 YALE L. J. 218, 234 (2012) (arguing that the adoption of moral rights is
beneficial because it will likely increase with the value of the work itself).
201
See Merges, supra note 16, at 2218 (“Patents were routinely declared invalid when
the wrong inventors were listed on a patent,” giving the party prosecuting a patent
application a strong incentive to name all inventors.).
202
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
203
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
204
See POLINSKY, supra note 80, at 131–32 (suggesting that it is easier to identify the
employer as the one responsible for the product’s success and to provide him an incentive
accordingly and, yet, it is difficult to measure how much each member of a working team
contributed to the product).
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claims that the current structure of the pro-corporate regime exacts
a price in terms of the quantity and quality of intellectual property
inventions and, thus, may be highly inefficient. In establishing the
appropriate policy, consideration should be had for the conditions
of uncertainty that are inherent in the development of IP products
and employee inventions, especially when employees waive all
rights before any products have even been conceived. Specifically,
this Article examines transactional uncertainties, risk allocation
and Principal-Agent relationships, and their effect on IP policy
aimed to enhance employee productivity in times of economic
crises or recession. The discussion relies on the foundational
underpinnings of law and economics theory, but applies its
presumptions in a new light, looking at the uncertain circumstances
surrounding the transaction at the time when rights are transferred
and, consequently, its normative significance.
From an economic perspective, incentives should be given to
motivate employees to create and to invest in and disclose their
inventions for the public welfare. Indeed, under certain
circumstances, it becomes justified to confer all rights in employee
inventions to the employer, but such a carte blanche conferral
would be overly broad and would not take into account economic,
and other, claims that justify the allocation of rights and certain
benefits specifically to the employee. I conclude that these
considerations are consistent with the overall spirit of encouraging
competition, employee mobility and creative ingenuity.

